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LIMITING RELIGIOUS TAX EXEMPTIONS: WHEN
SHOULD THE CHURCH RENDER UNTO CAESAR?
STFHE'N SCHWARZ"

The Bible relates that when the Pharisees asked Jesus whether it was
permissible to pay taxes to Caesar, Jesus replied that one should "Render
unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that
are God's."': The Pharisees had hoped to entrap Jesus with their inquiry,
but his response took them by surprise. It is said that they marveled at the
facility with which he avoided answering their question while seeming to
answer it with such profundity. But scholars suggest that his answer was no
answer at all, because Jesus failed to disclose what things were Caesar's and
what things were God's and who was to decide what rightfully belonged
2
to each.
The Pharisees may have been content with Jesus's equivocal response,
but their question persists. Since colonial days in America, and long before
then in other cultures, churches and other religious organizations have enjoyed
a variety of exemptions from income and property taxation. 3 Despite the
fact that these valuable benefits are firmly rooted in American law and tradition, they have inspired a continuing controversy. For many years, the debate
focused on whether religious tax exemptions were constitutional 4 But the
Supreme Court settled that matter in 1970 when it held in Walz v. Tax
Commission5 that a New York statute did not violate the establishment
clause of the first amendment by exempting from property taxation the land
and buildings owned by churches and used solely for religious worship. The
Court suggested that the tax benefits provided by the Internal Revenue Code
were similarly immune from attack on first amendment grounds, but it
declined to rule that religious tax exemptions were constitutionally required
by the free exercise clause. Congress and state legislatures were left free to
withdraw or limit their largesse, provided, of course, that religious institutions
were not discriminated against and that no religion was favored over any
other.
*B.A. 1966, Brown University; J.D. 1969, Columbia Law School; Assistant Professor of
Law, University of San Francisco School of Law.
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See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 644, 676-81 (1970); L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE
210-17 (rev. ed. 1967); Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property,
20 OHIo ST. L.J. 461 (1959).
4. See, e.g., Murray v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897 (1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966); Kauper, The Constitutionality of Tax Exemptions for
Religious Activities, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 95 (Oaks ed. 1963); L.
PFEFFER, supra note 3, at 210-17; Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE
L.J. 1285, 1286 n.7 (1969).
5. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
6. Id. at 676-78.
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The decision in Walz initially appeared to preserve and strengthen the

traditional preferred position of religious groups in our tax system. But several
recent developments suggest that the days of unlimited exemption may be
coming to an end. The proliferation of gurus, meditators, maharajahs and
other esoteric religious cults, some with a political bent, others with a more

commercial emphasis, plus the accumulation of substantial wealth by established religions, has provoked public interest and suspicion.7 Tax authorities are being pressured to define statutory terms such as "church" and

"religious purpose" more narrowly and to deny tax-exempt status to those
groups that fail to qualify. Tax exemptions have been revoked successfully
from religious groups which have engaged in certain proscribed "political"

activities8 or funnelled profits to the benefit of private individuals.9 Religious

schools practicing racial segregation have been threatened with loss of taxexempt status1- and, beginning in 1976, all churches became subject to taxation of their unrelated business income. 1 In addition, state and local govern-

ments, faced with the need to find new sources of revenue, are exploring
methods to add religious property to the tax rolls. At all levels, tax-exempt

organizations, including churches, are being called upon to reveal more about
their finances and to subject their property holdings, investments, and solicitation procedures to more stringent public scrutiny. 2 The reaction of organized

religion has been mixed, but many groups fear that these renewed attempts
to condition their exemptions improperly impinge upon the free exercise of
religion and threaten religious liberty.' 8
In light of these developments, the time is ripe for a,survey of the existing
federal tax laws governing religious organizations and an analysis of the
issues raised by attempts to limit religious tax exemptions. This article will

first explore the underlying rationale for the tax benefits granted to charitable
and religious organizations. It then will focus on the limitations on these

benefits imposed under the Internal Revenue Code and the peculiar problems
raised by applying the limitations to religious groups and the even narrower
category of churches. Throughout this discussion, an attempt will be made to

identify the inevitable constitutional questions raised by these limitations.
7. See, e.g., M. LARSON & C. LOWELL, THE RELIGIOUS EMPIRE (1976); Rice, The Pull
of Sun Moon, N.Y. Times Mag., May g0, 1976, at 8; Notes on Church-State Affairs, 18 J. OF
CHURCH & STATE 416-17 (1976).
8. See Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 1973-1
U.S.T.C. 19129 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
9. See Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. CI. 1969),
1969-2 U.S.T.C. 9538, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970).
10. Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 CuM. BULL. 158. See also Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally,
416 U.S. 725, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9438 (1974); Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 CUM. BULL. 587.
11. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§511, 512.
12. See M. LARSON & C. LOWELL, supra note 7; J. RUSKAY & R. OSSERMAN, HALFWAY TO
TAx REFORM (1970); REPORT OF COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS,
GIVING IN AMERIcA (1975); Deedy, Religious Fund-Raising Can Be Less Than a Lofty
Calling, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1976, §4 at 16.
13. See generally, Hearings on Legislative Activity by Certain Types of Exempt
Organizations Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 87-104,
194-211, 282-83, 286-87, 303-12 (statements by various religious organizations);
St. Ives, Church Tax Exemptions and Political Activities (unpublished, 1971).
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CURRENT TAX TREATMENT OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE

A.

Summary

Churches and other religious organizations enjoy a variety of tax benefits
under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The most important rules may be
summarized very simply:
(1) Income Tax Exemption: Section 501(a) of the Code 14 exempts from
federal income taxes organizations described in section 501(c)(3). The latter
provision encompasses nonprofit corporations "organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary,
or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals." Religious organizations, a category that includes both churches
and church-related entities, are thus exempted as part of a broad class of
quasi-public corporations commonly known as "charities."' 15
(2) Conditions on Exemption: An organization will be denied an exemption under section 501(c)(3) if it is a so-called "action" organization, that is,
if a "substantial" part of its activities consists of "carrying on propaganda,
or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation" or if it participates or
intervenes in "any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public
office."' 6 A further condition on exemption under section 501(c)(3) is that
"no part of the net earnings" may inure "to the benefit of any private share' '1
holder or individual.
(3) Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions: Contributions to those
religious organizations described in section 501(c)(3) are deductible for federal
income tax purposes.' 8 Gifts of cash to a "church or convention or association
of churches" and to most other religious organizations may be deducted by
an individual taxpayer 19 in an amount up to 50 percent of his adjusted
gross income. 20 Gifts of property also are deductible, subject to certain other
limitations. 2' Deductions are disallowed for contributions to an "action"
22
organization or to a group that violates the "no inurement" condition.
14. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, unless otherwise
noted.
15. Section 501(c)(3) organizations are also exempt from federal social security (F.I.C.A.)
taxes and from federal unemployment (F.U.T.A.) taxes. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§3121(b)(8)(B),

3306(c)(8).

16. Id. §501(c)(3); TREAS. E.G. §1.501(c)(3-(l)(c)(3). Under an amendment made by Tax
Reform Act of 1976, some charities will be eligible to elect, for taxable years beginning
after Dec. 31, 1976, to have their lobbying activities limited to a percentage of certain
expenditures incurred to influence legislation. Churches, however, may not elect to be
covered by the new rules. See text accompanying notes 188-92 infra.
17. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954. §501(c)(3).
18. Id. §§170(a), 170(c)(2). The organizations set forth in §170(c)(2) are, but for a
few exceptions, the same as those described in §501(c)(3).
19. Id. §§170(b)(1)(A)(i), 170(b)(1)(A)(vi), 170(b)(1)(F). For this purpose, adjusted gross
income is computed without regard to any net operating loss carryback. Id. §170(b)(1)(F).
20. Id. §170(b)(1)(A)(viii).
21.

Id. §§170(b)(1)(D), 170(e).

22.

Id. §170(c)(2)(C)-(d) and notes 8-9 supra. Similar provisions govern the deductibility

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1976

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 2
RELIGIOUS TAX EXEMPTIONS

(4) Unrelated Business Income Tax: Section 511 imposes a tax on the
"unrelated business income" of entities that otherwise have qualified for
exempt status. Unrelated business income is income from a business activity
23
that is not substantially related to the exempt purposes of the organization.
Prior to 1969, this tax applied only to certain tax exempt organizations, including religious organizations other than "churches." The Tax Reform
Act of 1969 extended the tax to churches and conventions or associations of
churches, but if a church or its predecessor carried on a trade or business
prior to May 27, 1969, application of the tax was deferred until taxable years
beginning on or after January 1, 1976.24 Since 1969, churches have also been
subject to tax on certain "unrelated debt-financed income," that is, income
from property acquired in whole or in part with borrowed funds. 25
(5) Reporting Requirements: Unlike most tax-exempt organizations,
churches, their "integrated auxiliaries" and "conventions or associations of
churches" are not required to file Form 990, an annual informational tax
return stating items of gross income, receipts and disbursements, the names
and addresses of all "substantial contributors" and of "highly compensated
employees," and various other information required by the regulations. 2
Also exempt from these requirements are: (a) other religious organizations
described in section 501(c)(3) with gross receipts in any tax year that are
'2
"normally not more than $5,000;"
7 (b) the exclusively religious activities of
28
any religious order; and (c) any section 501(c)(3) organization that is operated,
9
supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization.2
This summary of pertinent Code provisions reveals several categories of
benefited organizations that must be identified at the outset. The broadest
class consists of those organizations described in section 501(c)(8), often referred to collectively as "charities." Within this diverse class are entities
organized and operated exclusively for "religious purposes," that is, "religious
organizations." This latter category is then narrowed further to "churches,"
or a "convention or association of churches," a class which is intended to emof gifts and bequests to religious and other charitable organizations for federal estate and
gift tax purposes. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§2055(a)(2), 2522(a)(20).
23. Id. §512(a); TREAs. REG. §1.512(a). Some of the items not included as "unrelated
business income" are dividends, interest, annuities, royalties, capital gains, certain rents
from real property and a $1,000 specific deduction. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §512(b).
"Feeders" - corporations organized primarily to engage in business and whose profits are
required to be fed to a charity-are also subject to tax. Id. §502.
24. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §512(b)(16). See JoiNT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX REFORM Acr OF 1969, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67 (1970).
25. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §514. The unrelated business tax is subject to a host
of qualifications, conditions and exceptions, some of which will be discussed later in
this article. See text accompanying notes 258-84 infra.
26. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §6033(a)(1), 6033(a)(2)(A)(i). See TREAS. REG. §1.6033-2.
27. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §6033(a)(2)(A)(ii), (a)(2)(C)(i).

28. Id. §(a)(2)(A)(iii).
29. Id. §6033(a)(2)(C)(iv). In addition to these more relaxed reporting requirements,
§7605(c) protects churches from unreasonable audits by providing that the Internal Revenue
Service may not examine the books of account except after special notice from the Regional
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or a higher IR.S. official. If an audit is conducted,

the items to be examined are subject to further restrictions. See
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brace synagogues, mosques and other houses of worship. 30 For some purposes,
such as the basic tax exemption, the boundary lines between these categories
are immaterial. "Churches," however, enjoy the most favored tax status of all
nonprofit organizations in that they are not required to file information returns, are protected against unlimited audits, and prior to 1976, were exempt
from the unrelated business tax. 31
B.

Some Suggested Rationales

The practice of granting tax benefits to religious organizations has a
long history, dating back to pre-Revolutionary times The basic exemption
stems from the ill-fated Revenue Act of 1894, which exempted from tax
"corporations, companies, or associations organized and conducted solely for
charitable, religious, or educational purposes . . ."33 A similar exemption
was included in the corporate tax act enacted in 190934 and was carried over in
all the income tax laws enacted after the adoption of the sixteenth amendment.3 5
Despite this longevity, the underlying rationale for the exemption is far
from clear. However, a few random pronouncements from Congress and the
courts and the analyses of commentators 36 suggest several justifications, which
may generally be expressed as follows: (I) religious tax exemptions are
constitutionally required, (2) exemptions, together with tax deductions for
contributions, are justified on purely secular grounds because religious
organizations reduce the burdens of government and contribute to the
pluralism of American society, (3) religious organizations render a unique
service, essential to the survival of society, and therefore are entitled to a
preferred position under our tax system, and (4) religious groups, like many
other non-profit organizations, have no measurable net income and consequently are not appropriate objects of taxation. A brief discussion of these
theories is essential before turning to any meaningful evaluation of attempts
to limit tax benefits to religion.
The most expansive but least sound of these justifications is that religious
tax exemptions are compelled by the free exercise clause of the first amendment. This argument rests on the premise that a tax upon property used for
religious purposes or upon the income of an entity organized for those purposes
is itself a tax on the free exercise of religion. Tax exemption therefore is
30.

See generally Whelan, Definitional Problems with Respect to "Church" and "Re-

ligious Organization" in the Internal Revenue Code, in

SIXTH BIENNIAL CONFEREN E: TAX

TAX-EXEMlT STATUS AND CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS [hereinafter
cited as SIXTH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE] (1976).
31. See notes 24, 26-29, supra. In addition, prior to 1970, when the basic ceiling on
an individual taxpayer's deduction for charitable contributions was 20 percent of adjusted
gross income, "churches" and certain other public charities were part of the favored
group qualifying for an additional 10 percent deduction. See TREAS. REG. §1.170-2(b).
32. See Walz v. Tax Conim'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676-77 (1970).
33. Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, §32, 28 Stat. 556.
34. Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ci. 6, §38, 36 Stat. 112.
35. See, e.g., Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, §2(G), 38 Stat. 172.
36. See, e.g., R. DRINAN, RELIGION, THE COURTS AND PUBLIC POLICY 9 (1963).
PLANNING FOR FOUNDATIONS,
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regarded as an essential safeguard of religious freedom.37 This thesis relies
primarily on a series of Supreme Court decisions holding that exclusively
religious practices, such as preaching, performing mass, or door-to-door
peddling of religious literature, may not be taxed, even through the medium
of a general, nondiscriminatory license fee.38 The thrust of these holdings,
however, is that religious tax exemptions are mandatory only where a license
or privilege tax falls on the exercise of a religious activity, and thus might
render the continued existence of the activity virtually impossible3 9 It is
quite another matter to contend that taxing property used for religious
purposes or the income of a religious organization would abridge the free
exercise clause.40 It follows that although first amendment considerations inevitably pervade any analysis, religious tax exemptions are properly regarded
as matters of grace, not of constitutional right. 1
The secular purpose rationale is more widely accepted, but its proponents
differ as to the precise public policy being fostered. Analysis of this theory
necessarily begins with the recognition that religious organizations share
their exemption with a broad range of nonprofit entities, all of which are
believed to contribute to the well-being of the community. The exemption
is based on the theory that in exchange for the loss of tax revenue, the
government is relieved from the financial burden of providing services
presently provided by the private organizations. 42 This same policy underlies
the allowance of a charitable deduction for contributions to public charities. 43
The major weakness of this rationale is that churches and related religious
entities do not invariably engage in any substantial social service activities.
Some churches engage exclusively in divine worship, yet they nonetheless will
qualify for an exemption. The Supreme Court recognized this dilemma in
Walz when it refused to justify a religious property tax exemption on the
social welfare services or good works that some churches perform. To do
so, the court concluded, would require the Government to evaluate the
quantity and quality of social services, a process that would "give rise to
confrontations that would escalate to constitutional dimensions" through
excessive governmental entanglement with religion.- These difficulties are
avoided, however, by identifying a broader secular purpose for the exemption.
37. Several religious groups unsuccessfully advanced this argument in briefs amicus
curiae filed in the Walz case. See Brief for the National Council of Churches as Amicus
Curiae at 4-15, Brief for the Synagogue Council of America and its Constituents as Amici

Curiae at 9-14, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 644 (1970).
38.

Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.

105 (1943).
39. 319 U.S. at 112.
40. If extended to its illogical conclusion, this argument would preclude the imposition
of property or income taxes on newspapers, assembly halls, and movie theaters, all of
which are protected for some purposes by the first amendment.
41. See L. PFEFm, supra note 2, at 70.
42. See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924); H.R. REp. No. 1860, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. 18 (1938); B. HOPKINS & J. MYms, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS

2-3 (1975).
43. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456 (D.D.C. 1972).
44. 397 U.S. at 674 (1970).
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Quite apart from the good works that they may or may not perform, religious organizations are properly regarded as making a unique contribution
to the pluralism of American society through their purely religious activities.
Society benefits from this contribution and in return grants immunity from
taxation. Once again, this rationale applies not merely to religious groups
but also to the broad array of nonprofit organizations which contribute to
a pluralistic society. 45 All these groups, be they scientific, literary, educational,
or religious, further our moral and intellectual diversity and thus are permitted to exist without being burdened by taxes. Moreover, by allowing a
deduction for charitable contributions, society benefits by permitting a wide
variety of choices by individual philanthropists as to which activities to
further.46

The third major argument asserts that, while the claim that exemptions
are constitutionally compelled perhaps goes too far, religious organizations
nonetheless deserve a unique status wholly apart from constitutional considerations. It is urged that religion performs a special secular function in
our society by putting the lives of individuals into cosmic perspective and
by offering answers to ultimate questions as to the meaning of life in a way
that "makes sense" out of life.47 This theory rests on the premise that religious
liberty is essential to the survival of our society, and that government must
make a special effort to foster religious liberty by leaving religion alone.48
One way to leave it alone, of course, is by granting a tax exemption.
The final justification is based on the notion that religious organizations
are merely vehicles to conduct nonprofit activities on behalf of their members or the needs of their public beneficiaries. Such groups are regarded
as inappropriate objects of taxation because they do not realize "income" in
the ordinary sense of that term and, even if they did, it would not be
feasible to prescribe an appropriate tax rate based on ability to pay.4 9 Viewed
in this light, exemptions escape the labels "benefit" or "subsidy" and emerge
merely as reflections of established principles of income taxation.
This "pure tax" theory has a certain technical appeal, since it would be
conceptually difficult to adapt our present tax structure to the receipts and
disbursements of a church. For example, would dues and contributions be
considered "income?" Would church property be eligible for depreciation
deductions? Would expenditures for social services be considered "ordinary
and necessary business expenses?" These are but a few of the vexing issues
that might arise if churches were taxed. This argument does not fully support
45. B. HOPKINS & J. MYERS, supra note 42 at 3. See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
46. See SURREY, WARREN, MCDANIEL & AULT, I FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES
617 (1972).
Kelley, The Secular Importance of Religion: A RELIGIOUS LIBERTY RATIONALE FOR
TAX EXEMPTION, in SIxTI BIENNIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 30, at 183.
AND

MATERIALS

47.

48. Id. at 190-91.
49. For the most persuasive exposition of this "pure tax" theory for the exemption,
see Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income
Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976). See also Bittker, Churches, Taxes, and the Constitution, supra note 4.
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the property tax exemption, however, and it certainly does not justify the
charitable deduction or some of the other special benefits enjoyed only by
churches. 50 Moreover, to suggest that the concept of taxable income for a
church may be unexplored territory does not require the conclusion that
churches must retain their exemption under all circumstances. The drafters
of the Internal Revenue Code have managed to adapt the tax system to a
myriad of profit-oriented groups and they doubtless could confront the peculiar
problems of nonprofit organizations if the occasion were to arise.
Although none of these proposed justifications is entirely sound, it does
not necessarily follow that the granting of tax benefits to religion is a misguided public policy which should be overturned. Churches perform any
number of beneficial functions, they foster the pluralism of our society
through their purely religious functions and even atheistic or agnostic groups
contribute to the diversity of viewpoint that benefits the community. It also
seems undeniable that wholesale removal of religious tax benefits would
raise a number of constitutional and practical problems that arguably outweigh the additional revenue that might be raised. But religious organizations
are not unique in these respects. Rather, they are properly considered as
constituent members of that broad class of nonprofit voluntary associations
currently qualifying for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(8). This
perspective was adopted in Walz, where the Supreme Court recognized that
New York, like other states and the federal government, had not "singled
out one particular church or religious group or even churches as such" for
favored treatment, but had chosen to exempt houses of worship within
a broad class of property owned by nonprofit corporations. 51
The foregoing analysis suggests that if government decides to limit or
condition its largesse to this broad category of tax-exempt organizations, it
should do so in a manner that treats all groups equally. Religious organizations, and even the narrower category of "churches," should enjoy no special
immunity from these limitations apart from a certain sensitivity to their
status under the first amendment. This is not to suggest that all the limitations discussed in this article are defensible as a matter of policy or are
fairly administered by the Internal Revenue Service. It is only to propose that,
for tax purposes at least, churches and their related entities deserve no greater
or no fewer benefits or limitations than any other charitable organization
described in section 501(c)(3).
I.

LIMITING BY DEFINII[ON -

THE MEANING OF

'RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION" AND "CHURCH"

In order to qualify for federal tax-exempt status and the concomitant
privilege of receiving deductible contributions, a religious entity initially must
be organized and operated exclusively for "charitable" or "religious"
purposes. 52 Eligibility for other benefits turns on qualification as a "church
50. See text accompanying notes 24, 26-29, 31 supra.
51. 897 U.S. at 672-74 (1970). See also 397 U.S. at 687-89 (Brennan, J., concurring);
Id. at 696-98 (Harlan, J., concurring).
52. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §§501(c)(3), 170(c)(2)(B).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol29/iss1/2
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or convention or association of churches" or an "integrated auxiliary of a
church."5 3 Given the diversity of religious activities and beliefs, and the
structural diversity of churches and their related auxiliaries, these definitions
inevitably raise sensitive issues of classification. They also provide a threshold opportunity for tax authorities and courts to limit the availability of
tax benefits by concluding that an organization has failed to come within
the parameters of the pertinent statutory language.
A.

The "Charitable" Requirement

An analysis of statutory definitions must begin with the term "charitable,"
54
a familiar legal concept dating back to the British Statute of Charitable Uses.
"Charitable" is generally considered to be the crucial generic term in section
501(c)(3) and its counterparts. All other terms, such as "religious" or "educational," are merely enumerated examples of "charitable" purposes or activities. 5 Thus, a church or school seeking to qualify for the benefits accorded
by the Internal Revenue Code must not only be exclusively religious, in its
own frame of reference, but also must be a common law charity.
Religious organizations ordinarily satisfy the "charitable" requirement
without any difficulty. Although Congress has never defined the term, the
regulations expansively construe it in its "generally accepted legal sense" and
provide that charity includes such diverse activities as relief of the poor,
promotion of social welfare, advancement of education and science, promotion of health, and, significantly, advancement of religion.56 As thus interpreted, "charitable" means far more than mere benevolence or philanthropy
and comfortably can embrace a church whose sole purpose is explaining the
57
meaning of life to its members.

B.

The Meaning of "Religion"

Since a bona fide religious organization ordinarily will surmount the
"charitable" hurdle with little difficulty, the pivotal question then becomes
which organizations are "religious," or, more precisely, which activities
53. See text accompanying notes 24, 26-29, 31 supra.
54. The Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 4 (1601); See Bittker and Rahdert,
supra note 49, at 330-32.
55. See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1157-60, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. 19529 (D.D.C.),
aff'd sub. nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997, 1972-1 U.S.T.C. %9123A (1971). See also Rev.
Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 113, 116 and authorities cited therein; Note, Federal Tax
Benefits to Segregated Schools, 68 COLUM. L. RPv. 922, 941-42 (1968).
56. TREAS. REG. §1.501(c)(8;)-1(d)(2).
57. Of course, some limitations on the term "charitable" may affect religious organizations. For example, to be "charitable" under the common law, a trust could not be created
for a purpose which is illegal or contrary to some settled public policy. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TRUSTS §377, Comments a-c (1959). In recognition of this principle, the courts
have ruled that a racially discriminatory private school, although perhaps "educational,"
must be denied tax-exempt status because it is not "charitable." See Green v. Connally,
330 F. Supp. 1150, 1157-64, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. 19529, 87,145-51 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub. nom. Coit v.

Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). Application of this principle to religious schools will be discussed
in a separate section of this article. See text accompanying notes 209-230 infra.
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constitute "exclusively religious purposes." The vast panoply of beliefs in
this country the definitional task inordinately delicate and complex. Does
an organization qualify as religious only if it believes in a Supreme Being
and engages in traditional religious ritual? Is it "religious" if its primary
tenet of faith is to oppose Communism or engage in "political" activities?
Can a commercial enterprise be a "religion" if its members sincerely believe
in the almighty dollar? If the principal precept of a church is the cultivation
and ingestion of psychedelic drugs, should it qualify for tax-exempt status?
The history of attempts to draw a dividing line between what is and
what is not a religion has been marked by understandable confusion.58
Congress has never entered the quagmire, and a definition of "religious
purpose" is conspicuously absent from the regulations interpreting section 501(c)(3).5 9 The Exempt Organizations Handbook, a portion of the
Internal Revenue Manual, is more bold, advising revenue agents that "[t]he
statutory term 'religion' has been defined broadly" and suggesting that
constitutional difficulties would be presented if section 501(c)(3) were interpreted to exclude "even those beliefs that do not encompass a Supreme
Being in the conventional sense, such as Taoism, Buddhism, and Secular
Humanism." 60 The Handbook goes on to advise, however, that activities
furthering a belief must be "exclusively religious," and if the activities promote some "extraneous purpose," exemption may be denied.61
Apart from the inherent complexity of the task, this reluctance to interpret
the term "religious" initially can be explained by constitutional considerations.
A leading case in this regard is United States v. Ballard,62 in which the
Supreme Court was confronted with the mail fraud prosecution of the Ballard
family, proponents of an eccentric sect known as the "I Am" Movement. In
soliciting funds from the public through the mails, Guy Ballard represented
that he had shaken hands with Jesus Christ and had been selected as a divine
messenger with supernatural powers to cure all diseases. 6s The Court held
that the trial judge had properly withheld from the jury all questions regarding the truth of the Ballards' religious beliefs or doctrines6 and further
stated what some perceive to be a basic constitutional stricture on defining
religion:

58. For some noble attempts to draw the line, see Boyan, Defining Religion in
Operational and Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 479 (1968); Brancato, Characterization in Religious Property Tax Exemption: What is Religion-A Survey and a Proposed
Definition and Approach, 44 NoRE DAME LAw. 60 (1968); Comment, Defining Religion: Of
God, the Constitution and the D.A.R., 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 533 (1965).
59. See, e.g., TRa.As. REG. §1,501(c)(3)-1(d). By contrast, these regulations include ex-

tensive definitions of other exempt purposes.
60. Exempt Organizations Handbook, Int. Rev. Manual 11 (671), §755.1 (1972).
61. Id. See also Puritan Church of America v. Commissioner, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
J18,332 (1951), 1953-2 U.S.T.C.
denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954).

9601, aff'd per curiam, 209 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert.

62. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
63. See L. PFEFFR,supra note 2, at 306.
64. 322 U.S. at 85-86.
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Man's relation to his God was made no concern of the state. He was
granted the right to worship as he pleased and to answer to no man
for the verity of his religious views. The religious views espoused by
respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most
people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged
with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with
the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact undertake that
task, they enter a forbidden domain. 5
Since Ballard, the Court has held that civil courts may not, consistently
with the first amendment, determine ecclesiastical questions in resolving
church property disputes.66 Taken together, these authorities narrow the
nature of governmental inquiry, but they do not require the Internal Revenue
Service and the courts to accede to the claims of just any enterprise calling
itself a religion.
Some objective definitional process is still required to
determine which groups qualify for statutory tax benefits.
The process currently evolving in the courts has expanded the concept
of religion far beyond traditional dictionary definitions.6 8 It is now settled,
for example, that individuals or sects that do not believe in a conventional
God or gods still may qualify as "religious" for tax exemption purposes.6 9
A leading case dispensing with the Supreme Being requirement is Fellowship
of Humanity v. County of Alameda,7O in which the court held that a nontheistic humanistic society qualified for a California property tax exemption
on land and buildings used "solely and exclusively for religious worship."
Recognizing that the content of the group's beliefs was not a matter of
governmental concern, the court exhaustively analyzed various proposed
definitions of religion and enunciated a two-pronged test under which a sect
65. Id. at 87.
66. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America and Canada
v. Milivojevich,

U.S.

, 96 S. Ct. 2372

(1976); Presbyterian Church of the United

States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
67. See, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968).
68. See Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 681,
315 P.2d 394, 399 (1957).
69. Earlier cases took a more restrictive approach, interpreting "religion" as requiring
a recognition of a Supreme Being. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). One
of the classic traditional definitions appears in United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605,
633-34 (1931), in which Chief Justice Hughes stated in a dissent: "The essence of religion is
belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation. . . . One cannot speak of religious liberty, with proper appreciation of its
essential and historic significance, without assuming the existence of a belief in a supreme
allegiance to the will of God." A similar interpretation was adopted in several early

draft cases construing the "religious training and belief" exception for conscientious
objectors. See, e.g., Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
795 (1946). But cf. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943). The fallacy of
this definition is obvious. Although the concept of God is compatible with our JudeoChristian tradition, many ancient and well-recognized religions, such as Buddhism, Taoism,
and Confucianism, are not theistic. See L. PFEFFER, supra note 2, at 152.
70. 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957). See also Washington Ethical Soc'y v.
District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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was religious if (1) its beliefs occupied the same place for its adherents that
orthodox beliefs occupied in the lives of their followers and (2) the group
conducted itself in a manner similar to groups that were concededly religious.7 1 The court went on to identify the following objective characteristics
of a religion: (1) a belief, not necessarily referring to supernatural powers;
(2) a cult, involving a gregarious association openly expressing the belief;
(3) a system of moral practice directly resulting from an adherence to the
belief; and (4) an organization within the cult designed to observe the
tenets of belief.7 2
The Supreme Court similarly has taken God out of religion. In United
States v. Seeger,73 the Court held that the exemption from combatant status
for those who conscientiously object "by reason of religious training and
belief" embraced those applicants with sincere and meaningful beliefs which
occupied the same place in their lives as an orthodox belief in God would
hold in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption. 74 The Court stated
that, in applying this test, the task is to "decide whether the beliefs professed
by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme
of things, religious." 75 On the other hand, the Court emphasized that religious
beliefs did not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical
views, or a merely personal moral code, and it suggested that its definition
was not intended to embrace atheists.70
C.

MarginalReligions

The tests enunciated in Fellowship of Humanity and Seeger may be useful
when applied in their own factual settings. Indeed, serious constitutional
questions would have been presented if the courts had adopted a more
restrictive definition in those cases. But there is a point at which an elastic
test may be stretched beyond the limits of its logic. An illustrative case is
Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States,77 a suit involving the tax exempt
status of a church whose primary activities were the indiscriminate issuance
of mail order church charters and honorary Doctor of Divinity degrees. The
church would ordain anyone as a minister for a $20 "free will offering," but
no money was ever required as a condition for the issuance of minister's
credentials. Although meetings were held in the church chapel - a reconverted
garage at the home of its founder -the church had no doctrines other than
"to do whatever's right, to stay within the confines of the law."78
71. 153 Cal. App. 2d at 692, 815 P.2d at 406.
72. Id. at 693, 315 P.2d at 406.
73. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). See also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). Cf.
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
74. 380 U.S. at 176.
75. Id. at 185.
76. Id. at 173. Nonetheless, in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), the Court
held that an applicant whose opposition to war was based on readings in the fields

of history and sociology qualified for a conscientious objector exemption because these
beliefs, in his own scheme of things, were "religious."
77. 372 F. Supp. 770, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. J9345 (E.D. Cal. 1974).
78. Id. at 772-73, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,795-96.
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The Internal Revenue Service denied an exemption to the church on
the ground that, in this peculiar factual context, the granting of ordinations
and the issuance of church charters and honorary Doctor of Divinity degrees
to unknown persons for unknown reasons furthered neither a religious nor
an educational purpose.79 The court disagreed however, stressing that the
ordination of ministers was a traditional religious activity and stating further:
Neither this Court, nor any branch of this Government, will consider
the merits or fallacies of a religion. Nor will the Court compare the
beliefs, dogmas, and practices of a newly organized religion with those
of an older, more established religion. Nor will the Court praise or
condemn a religion, however excellent or fanatical or preposterous it
the Court to do so, it would impinge upon the First
may seem. Were
0
Amendment.8
The court's conclusion is questionable since it was not asked to praise or
condemn the church or pass judgment on the verity of its beliefs. It merely
was requested to rule that its purposes were not religious within the meaning
of the statute because it arguably had no real tenets, made no genuine
attempt to explain life in its ultimate terms and was not playing a role for
its adherents that would be parallel to the role played by an orthodox
religion in the minds of its followers.81
Other tax exemption cases evidence a similar indisposition to withdraw
tax benefits from unorthodox religious groups or even organizations with a
commercial bent.8 2 Occasionally, however, a factual setting will be so extreme
79. Id. at 771, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,794. The Service also argued that by issuing
honorary Doctor of Divinity titles, the church was either engaging in illegal activities or
violating public policy, as expressed in provisions of the California Education Code prohibiting the dissemination of degrees. It was established at trial, however, that the issuance
of divinity doctorates was not violative of state law. Id. at 771-73, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,795-96.
This unnecessary excursion appears to have substantially weakened the government's case.
80. id. at 776, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,798.
81. The Department of Justice did not appeal Universal Life Church, primarily
because the case involved a relatively small amount of revenue (about $10,000) and was
regarded as a weak factual vehicle. The church subsequently was granted a ruling by the
Service recognizing its tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3). It is understood that the
government is extremely reluctant to litigate the question whether a church is "religious"
unless there are substantial commercial operations as compared to minuscule or patently
insincere religious activities. (This information was disclosed to the author in interviews
with attorneys in the Tax Division, United States Department of Justice).
82. See, e.g., St. Germain Foundation, 26 T.C. 648 (1956) (organization formed to
propagate teachings of "I Am Movement" through conclaves and mail order activities
held exempt; fact that precepts might be bizarre or untrue was irrelevant); Unity School
of Christianity, 4 B.T.A. 61 (1926) (organization formed to promote Christianity and
moral development through sale of publications, radio broadcasts, and the conduct
of an inn and a farm held to be "religious"; commercial activities viewed as "incidental"
to religious purposes); Elisian Guild, Inc. v. United States, 412 F.2d 121, 1969-2 U.S.T.C.
9483 (1st Cir. 1969) (organization formed to publish and disseminate religious books and
pamphlets, held exempt; lack of substantial profits evidenced absence of substantial commercial purposes). But see Scripture Press Foundation v. United States, 285 F.2d 800, 1961-1
U.S.T.C. 9195 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962) (exemption denied to non-profit
corporation operating a religious publishing house; sale of materials directly in conduct
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that a court will draw the line because a claimant appears to be insincere
or simply bizarre. A notable example in a non-tax context is United States
v. Kuch,ss which involved the drug prosecution of a leader of the NeoAmerican Church, an organization of some 20,000 members who considered
psychedelic drugs to be sacramental foods. In addressing the defendant's
motion to dismiss on the ground that her rights to free exercise of religion
had been violated, the court concluded that it could not avoid the definitional
inquiry.8 4 It went on to hold that the church was not a religion because the
a
record presented "[no] solid evidence of a belief in a supreme being,
85
religious discipline, a ritual, or tenets to guide one's daily existence."
The result in Kuch may seem obvious, but the case still has unsettling
ramifications. In effect, the court appears to have concluded that the NeoAmerican Church was not a religion by applying a type of "smell" test
which ordinarily will be detrimental to an incipient movement with an
untested theology. Although objective facts and circumstances will be
enumerated, the ultimate conclusion will be based on a subjective judgment
that whatever religion may be, "I know it when I see it,' s6.and this is not it.
Judgments of this nature inevitably run the risk of being influenced by one's
moral and ethical orientation. A Christian or Jew, for example, may find
it impossible to accept the sincerity of a "church" that characterizes a "Boo
Hoo" as a bishop, marijuana as a sacrament or "Puff the Magic Dragon"
as a song of spiritual significance. But a member of the Neo-American
Church may harbor similar skepticism toward rabbis, skull caps, wafers,
wine, and the Holy Ghost.
Ultimately, it may be impossible and unnecessary to define religion with
any real precision, and the evolving liberality toward marginal religious
of trade or business for profit). For additional discussion of the problems of religious
organizations 'engaging in commercial activities, see text accompanying notes 237-302 infra.
83. 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968).
84. Id. at 443. Judge Gesell recognized that the inquiry would be subtle and difficult
but nonetheless stated: "There is need to develop a sharper line of demarcation between
religious activities and personal codes of conduct that lack spiritual import. Those who
seek the constitutional protections for their participation in an establishment of religion
and freedom to practice its beliefs must not be permitted the special freedoms this
sanctuary may provide merely by adopting religious nomenclature and cynically using
it as a shield to protect them when participating in antisocial conduct that otherwise
stands condemned." Id.
85. Id. at 444. The Court was assisted in reaching this conclusion by its finding that
the church had a "Catechism" (asserting "we have the right to practice our religion,
even if we are a bunch of filthy drunken bums'), official songs ("Puff, the Magic
Dragon" and "Row, Row, Row Your Boat"), a church key (a bottle opener), a bulletin
(known as "Divine Toad Sweat'), an order of bishops (known as "Boo Hoos"), a symbol
(a three-eyed toad), and a motto ("Victory Over Horseshit'). Id. at 443-44. Cf. In re
Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964). But cf. People v. Woody,
61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (California could not constitutionally
proscribe use of the hallucinogenic drug peyote by Navajo Indian tribe; belief in drug
as sacramental symbol found to be bona fide).
86. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). By alluding
to Mr. Justice Stewart's famous conceptualization, the author is not intending to equate
religion with pornography.
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beliefs is probably more desirable than the subjectivity that more rigid definitional standards might require. The need remains, however, for a flexible
set of guidelines that will withstand constitutional scrutiny and simultaneously
ensure that the activities of an organization claiming to be "religious" are
not grossly incompatible with the policies underlying the tax benefits being
sought. In all events, the bona fides of a claimed religion should be tested,
and exemptions should be denied if an organization's claim is patently insincere. Objective manifestations of such insincerity would include the absence
of any beliefs regarding man's place in the universe or the presence of activities or rituals that are in no way parallel to the practices of more orthodox
religious bodies. Beliefs that may seem absurd when compared to the JudeoChristian tradition should not, in themselves, lead to disqualification, nor
should the absence of certain formalities. But groups should be denied tax
benefits if it is objectively determined that, despite some outer trappings of
religion, they are organized primarily to conduct a business, accumulate
wealth through investments, engage in illegal activities, or espouse partisan
7
political views.1
D.

The Meaning of Church

A related definitional problem arises from the special tax status accorded
by several Code provisions to a "church or a convention or association of
churches." 88 In using this phrase, Congress evidenced an intent to grant
preferred treatment to a narrower category than the terms "religious organization" would embrace, but it is unclear where it intended to draw the line.89
The phrase "church or convention or association of churches" first
appeared in the Revenue Act of 1950, which exempted those bodies from the
newly enacted unrelated business tax. The bill passed by the House only
exempted income received by a "church." 90 Questions immediately arose over
the scope of that term, and when the bill reached the Senate Finance Committee, it was unclear whether the exemption would cover cooperative religious bodies controlled or supported by independent churches. Prompted by
groups such as the Southern Baptist Convention, the Finance Committee
"clarified" the provision to ensure that associations or conventions of

87. Of course, denial of tax benefits on these grounds does not necessarily require
a finding that an organization is not "religious." The Code contains independent provisions, such as the proscriptions on inurement of private gain and the limitations on
influencing legislation and political campaign intervention, which have been held to apply
to religious organizations. See, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412
F.2d 1197, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. 9538 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970); Christian
Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 19129 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973). These limitations are discussed in the text
accompanying notes 107-94 infra.
88. See notes 19, 23-24, 26-29 supra. This question may become somewhat less urgent
now that churches no longer enjoy an exemption from the unrelated business tax, but
it will remain an issue as long as "churches" are singled out for any special benefits.
89. See text accompanying notes 30-31.
90. H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1950), 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 380, 408.
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churches were exempt, but it declined to exclude orphanages, hospitals,
schools, colleges and universities that were organized under church auspices. 91
The first regulations promulgated under the 1950 Act made it clear that
religious organizations and "religious orders," if not themselves churches
or associations or conventions of churches, would not be within the exemption. For example, the regulations provided that an incorporated university
would not be immune from taxation on unrelated business income, irrespective of whether it was organized by or operated under the auspices of
a church.9 2 It was still uncertain, however, what functions a "religious order"
had to perform in order to be a church. In addition, it was unclear whether
qualification as a "church" would turn on the law of the state of incorporation, the internal ecclesiastical law of the group involved, or on an undeveloped federal tax law definition of the term. 93
An attempt at clarification was made in the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, which in its original House version increased the percentage limitations
for tax deduction purposes, provided that contributions were made to certain
preferred charities, including "a church or a convention or association of
churches or a religious order."94 At the request of representatives of the
Catholic Church, the Senate Finance Committee deleted the phrase "or a
religious order" from the bill, explaining that use of that language might
tend to limit the scope of the term "church."9 5 The Committee stated its
understanding that religious orders and other related entities are regarded
by some denominations as carrying out the functions of the church, even
though they might be separately incorporated. 96 In urging the Committee
to make this clarification, the Catholic Church was attempting to expand the
definition of "church" and ensure that the term would be interpreted in
accordance with the internal ecclesiastical law of the denomination in9
volved. 7
The unrelated business tax regulations promulgated under the 1954 Code,
which remain applicable for pre-1970 tax years, made a further attempt at
clarification by providing that to qualify as a "church," an organization had
to perform "sacerdotal functions" and conduct "religious worship."9 8 Re91. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1950), 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 483, 504; H.
CONF. RFP. No. 3124, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), 1950-2 GuM. BULL. 580, 588. See also
De La Salle Institute v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891, 899, 1961-2 U.S.T.C. 19609 at
81,498 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
92. TREAs. REG. 29.421-2(a)(3) (1950) (now TREAs. REG. §1.511-2(a)(3)(ii)).
93. These questions appear to have been of particular concern to the Roman Catholic
Church, which regarded religious orders and other entities established under canon law
to be entitled to "church" status irrespective of the actual functions they might perform.
See Garland & Cahill, The Concept of CHURCH in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code,
I CATH. LAw. 27 (1955).
94. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. §170 (1954).
95. S. REP. No.
96. Id.
97. See Garland
States, 195 F. Supp.
Cal. 1961).
98. TRwAS. REaG.

1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1954).
& Cahill, supra note 90, at 30-31; De La Salle Institute v. United
891, 900, 905-06, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. 9809 at 81,498-99, 81,502-05 (N.D.
§1.511-2(a)(3)(ii). The determination of what constitutes the conduct
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ligious orders and other organizations also could qualify if they were organized
as an integral part of a church, but only if they carried out sacerdotal functions and conducted religious worship. Once a religious order qualified,
"church" status would be granted to all of its activities, including those conducted through a separate corporation, provided it was not operated for the
primary purpose of making a profit.99
The somewhat restrictive definition of the regulations was upheld in
De La Salle Institute v. United States,100 the only litigated case in the area,
in which the court construed the term "church" to exclude the De La Salle
Institute and the Christian Brothers Order, both adjuncts of the Roman
Catholic Church. 10 1 The Institute, all of whose members belonged to the
Christian Brothers, operated a novitiate, parochial schools, homes, and a
profitable winery. The Order was organized as an integral part of the Catholic
Church, but its members were not priests and their primary function was
education of children, not the conduct of worship services. After an extensive
review of the legislative history, the court decided to construe the statute
in light of common understanding and usage rather than rigid conceptions of
canon law which considers the teaching of religion to be a primary church
function. Viewed in this light, neither the Institute nor the Order could
qualify as a church because furnishing children with education and making
wine were simply not church functions within the meaning of the Internal
02
Revenue Code.
The decision in De La Salle Institute comports with the pertinent legislative history, which shows that Congress did not intend to expand the definition of church to embrace every organization that might be operated under
church auspices. Controversy nonetheless continues. In proposed regulations
promulgated after enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the Treasury
once again defined church restrictively, providing that in determining whether
a religious organization was a church, primary consideration should be given
to whether the duties of the group included the ministration of sacerdotal
functions and the conduct of religious worship. 10 But the Catholic Church,
concerned that this definition would not embrace religious congregations of
sisters and brothers, successfully persuaded the Treasury to withdraw these
regulations, and they have yet to be replaced. 4
of religious worship or the ministration of sacerdotal functions depends on the tenets
and practices of the religious body under scrutiny.
99. Id.
100. 195 F. Supp. 891, 1961-2 U.S.T.C. %9609 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
101. The result of this decision was to subject the winery income of the Institute to
the unrelated business tax.
102. 195 F. Supp. at 900-03, 1961-2 U.S.T.C. at 81,500-02. The court also took issue
with that portion of the regulation that included separate corporations or entities owned
by a qualifying religious order within the "church" category.
103. PROPOSED TREAS. REG. §1.170 A-9(a), 36 Fed. Reg. 9298 (1971).
104. See Whelan, Churches and the Tax on Unrelated Business Income, 20 CATH.
LAw. 359-61 (1974). The current regulations are somewhat circular, providing that "[A]n
organization is described in §170(b)(1)(A)(i) [referring to 'a church or a convention or
association of churches'] if it is a church or a convention or association of churches."
TaaE.s. REG. §1.170A-9(a). With respect to unorthodox churches, however, the Service
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The debate over the scope of the term "church" appears destined to continue, and Congress triggered additional controversy in 1969 by providing a
mandatory exception from the exempt organization filing requirements for
"integrated auxiliaries" of churches and "the exclusively religious activities
of any religious order." 10 5- As some church leaders have suggested, the sensible
solution to all of these problems would be to eliminate them altogether by
withdrawing preferred treatment from churches and treating all religious
organizations on a par with other benefited groups.30 6
I.

LIMITATIONS ON POLITICAL AcTInVTs

One of the major conditions for tax exemption under section 501(c)(5)
and for qualification to receive deductible charitable contributions for income,
estate or gift tax purposes is that "no substantial part of the activities of
[the organization] is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to,
influence legislation." Organizations also may not "participate in, or intervene
in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office." These "political
L0 7
limitations" have been the subject of mounting criticism for many years,
but only recently have they threatened the preferred tax status of religious
organizations. A brief overview of the limitations is necessary before consideration of the specific problems of the politically active church.
A.

Background of the Limitations

1. Influencing Legislation. The specific prohibition on "substantial"
attempts to influence legislation originated in the Revenue Act of 1934.108
appears to be taking an even more restrictive view than in the now defunct regulations.
It is understood that in an unpublished technical advice memorandum, the National
Office of the Service has set forth a list of "church characteristics," including: (1) a
distinct legal existence, (2) a recognized creed and form of worship, (3) a definite and
distinct ecclesiastical government, (4) a formal code of doctrine and discipline, (5) a
distinct religious history, (6) a membership not' associated with any church or denomination, (7) a complete organization of ordained ministers who are selected after completing
prescribed courses of study, (8) a literature of its own, (9) established places of worship,
(10) regular congregations, (11) regular religious services, (12) Sunday schools for the
religious instruction of the young, and (13) schools for the preparation of its ministers.
See B. HOPKINS & J. MYERs, supra note 42, at 87.
105. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6033(a)(2)(A).
106. Kelley, supra note 47, at 191. Other spokesmen, such as Dean Kelley, Director
of Governmental Relations of The National Council of Churches, have urged that the
special status should be preserved, but only to organizations that have satisfied a "test
of time" by existing for at least fifty years. Id. at 192-93.
107. The political limitations have inspired voluminous literature, most of it critical.
See, e.g., Clark, The Limitation on Political Activities: A Discordant Note in the Law
of Charities, 46 VA. L. Rxv. 489 (1960); Troyer, Charities, Law-Making, and the Constitution: The Validity ol the Restrictions on Influencing Legislation, 31 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED.
TAX 1415 (1973); Note, Religion in Politics and the Income Tax Exemption, 42 Foma. L.
REv. 897 (1978).
108. Revenue Act of 1934, §§23(o)(2), 101(6) (now IN'T. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§170(c)(2),
501(c)(3)).
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Prior to that time, the only means of denying exempt status to organizations
engaging in political action was to contend, as the regulations then provided,
that the dissemination of any "controversial or partisan propaganda" was
not an exempt (charitable, educational or religious) purpose. 0 9 The government advanced this position with varying success in a number of cases, the
most notable of which was Slee v. Commissioner.-1° In that case, the Second
Circuit held that the American Birth Control League was not eligible to
receive tax deductible contributions because it had disseminated propaganda
to legislators and the public for the purpose of repealing laws against birth
control. In holding that the league was not operated exclusively for charitable
or educational purposes, judge Learned Hand stated that "political agitation
as such is outside the statute, however innocent the aim.""' But then he retreated slightly by suggesting that political activity should not disqualify an
organization when its agitation was ancillary to the group's end in chief or
closely related to its primary purpose. 112
Although the legislative history of the lobbying limitation is susceptible
to varying interpretations, it can be understood as a partial response to Slee
and its predecessors. The amendment initially was intended to bar tax
deductions for gifts to organizations formed to advance a donor's private
political interests. Since this approach presented drafting problems, the bill
was broadened to prohibit any "substantial" lobbying." 3 The effect of adding
this specific proscription was to relax the Slee rule by permitting insubstantial
lobbying for whatever reasons, but to expand the rule by prohibiting "substantial" ancillary lobbying activities even if they were aimed at promoting
the primary purposes of the organization.
It is fair to assume that Congress gave virtually no thought to what it
was doing when it enacted the "no substantial ...propaganda" clause, and
it is highly unlikely that it ever imagined that the section might be applied
to threaten a church. But some attempt at divining the legislative intent
must be made. One possible interpretation is that the amendment merely
was intended as clarifying language that affirmed the Treasury's view that
109. TREas. REG. 45, art. 517(1) (1919).
110. 42 F.2d 184, 1937-2 U.S.T.C. 1552 (2d Cir. 1930). See also Herbert E. Fales, 9 B.T.A.
828 (1927); H.S. Vanderbilt, 34 B.T.A. 1033 (1936), afl'd, 93 F.2d 360, 37-2 U.S.T.C. %9596
(1st Cir. 1937).
111. 42 F.2d at 185, 2 U.S.T.C. at 2303.
112. Id. Judge Hand's rationale is far from clear, but he may have been suggesting
that there was some latitude for ancillary political activity by an organization if it
was either "incidental" or bore a close relationship to the group's primary purposes.
Later cases support this view of pre-1934 law. See, e.g., Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
122 F.2d 108, 1941-2 U.S.T.C. 10,069 (3d Cir. 1941), in which the exemption of a religious
organization was upheld notwithstanding that it actively opposed the repeal of prohibition. The Court took the view that, at least before the 1934 amendment, the law
did not preclude a religious organization from engaging in legislative activity in furtherance
of its purposes. Accord, Lord's Day Alliance of Pennsylvania v. United States, 65 F.
Supp. 62 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
113. See 78 CONG. REc. 5861, 5959, 7831; Troyer, supra note 107, at 1421; Cooper, The
Tax Treatment of Business Grassroots Lobbying: Defining and Attaining the Public
Policy Objectives, 68 CoLUM. L. REv. 801, 816-17 (1968).
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political action could never be charitable or educational for tax purposes. 114
A more forceful argument has been made that the term "charitable," in its
generally accepted legal sense, comfortably embraces efforts to change existing
law in order to advance a charity's purposes." 5 If that view is sound, the
1934 amendment must be interpreted as an independent condition on qualification that shifts the focus from an organization's motives for lobbying to its
identifiable attempts to influence legislation and the degree to which it
engages in them. If a church chose to influence legislation, there would be no
basis for contending that it was not operated exclusively for charitable and
religious purposes. Nonetheless, the church would risk loss of its exemption
because of the specific statutory proscription and it would be no defense
that its political activities might have been religiously motivated.116
2. Limitations on Political Campaign Intervention. The bar against
participation or intervention in political campaigns has an even murkier
background. It originated as a Senate floor amendment to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 and passed without explanatory comment, other than a statement by its sponsor, then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas, that it was
intended to "extend" the limitations of section 501(c)()."17 It is understood
that Senator Johnson was attempting to curb the activities of a private
foundation that he believed had provided indirect financial support to his
opponent in a Texas election." 8 Curiously this proscription was inserted
only in the basic exemption section. It was not until 15 years later that it
was included in the corresponding charitable deduction provisions; until
corrected this created the anomaly that an organization might qualify to
receive deductible gifts but not qualify for exempt status under section
501(c)(3). 19
3. Judicial Interpretations of the Limitations. In light of this obscure
legislative history, it is not surprising that the courts have been unable to
agree on the meaning and scope of the political limitations. One uncertainty
concerns the relevance of an organization's motives for influencing legislation.
Earlier cases took the position that the limitations were intended only to
proscribe the "evil" type of lobbying that served selfish motives and was
characterized by factual distortions;120 legislative activity for the "general
114. See Cooper, supra note 113, at 817; cf. TREAS. REG. §1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3).
115. See Troyer, supra note 113, at 1421-24; Statement of Paul S. Berger on Behalf of
the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council in Hearings On Legislative
Activity by Certain Types of Exempt Organizations, supra note 13, at 92-96.

116. See Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 1973-1
U.S.T.C. 19129 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); cf. Haswell v. United
States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. 9591 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
117. See 100 CONG. REc. 9604 (1954); H. CONF. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., Ist Sess.

46 (1954).
118.

B. HoPKINs & J. MYRzS, supra note 42, at 124.

119. Tax Reform Act of 1969, §§201(a), (d).
120. See St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427, 1967-1 U.S.T.C.
12,457 (8th Cir. 1967); Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362, 1960-1 U.S.T.C. J11,916 (2d
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834 (1960); Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907,
1956-1 U.S.T.C. 19135 (6th Cir. 1955).
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good," would not be prohibited. The statute, however, simply speaks in terms
of attempts to influence legislation, whether they be good, bad, or indifferent.
Accordingly, more recent authorities have concluded that an organization's
21
motive for lobbying is irrelevant in determining if the limitations apply.'
Questions have also been raised as to whether the lobbying limitation was
intended to embrace "grassroots lobbying" in the forum of public opinion
as well as direct dealings with legislators. An early case said that it was
not, but a consensus seems to have developed that concerted attempts to
1
influence public opinion on pending legislation is prohibited.

22

The most bewildering question of all has been the meaning of the term
"substantial." One decision held that less than five percent of the time and
12
effort of organizations devoted to legislative activities was not substantial. 3
More recently, courts have disavowed any percentage test, preferring instead
a qualitative balancing approach, under which all the facts and circumstances
are sifted "in the context of the objectives and circumstances of the organization.""24
4. The Treasury Regulations. The regulations interpreting the political
limitations have cleared up some ambiguities and created others. They reaffirm the Treasury's pre-1934 view that lobbying activities are inherently incompatible with any exempt purposes by providing an "operational test"
under which "[ain organization is not operated exclusively for one or more
exempt purposes if it is an 'action organization' . . . ... 125 The regulations
further provide:
An organization is an "action" organization if a substantial part
of its activities is attempting to influence legislation by propaganda
or otherwise. For this purpose, an organization will be regarded as
attempting to influence legislation if the organization (a) Contacts, or urges the public to contact, members of a legislative body for the purpose of proposing, supporting, or opposing
legislation; or
126
(b) Advocates the adoption or rejection of legislation.
121. See Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. 9591 (Ct. CI. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975); Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United
States, 470 F.2d 849, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 19129 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864

(1973); Kuper v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 562, 1964-2 U.S.T.C. 9541 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964); League of Women Voters v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379,
1960-1 U.S.T.C. 11,924 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960).
122. Compare Martha Hubbard Davis, 22 T.C. 1091 (1954), acquiesced in, 1954-2 CUM.
BULL. 4, with Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849,

1973-1 U.S.T.C. 19129 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
123. Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907, 1956-1 U.S.T.C. 19135 (6th Cir. 1955).
124. See Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. 9591 (Ct. Cl. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975); Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United
States, 470 F.2d 849, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 9129 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864

(1973).
125.

TREAS. REG.

§1.501(c)(3)-I(c)(3)(i).

126. Id. §1.501(c)(3)-I(c)(3)(ii). A second type of action organization is one which
has the following two characteristics: (1) its main or primary, objective or objectives may
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"Legislation" is deemed to include action by the Congress, state legislatures,
local governing bodies or referendums and initiatives.1 27 Significantly, the
regulations make no attempt to define the word "substantial."' 2
The regulations interpreting the political campaign intervention clause
do little more than track the statute. They provide that political campaign
participation or intervention includes, but is not limited to, the publication
or distribution of written statements or the making of oral statements "on
behalf of or in opposition to" candidates who offer themselves, or are proposed by others, as candidates for elective public office.12 9 This proscription,
unlike the limitation on influencing legislation, is not subject to any substantiality test. Theoretically, even this slightest transgression would trigger
disqualification, but in practice de minimis violations ordinarily have been
ignored.
B.

Applying the Limitations to Churches

During most of their tortured history, the political limitations rarely have
been threatening to religious organizations. Many churches simply did not
involve themselves in political pursuits, and those that did could always
point to some nexus with their religious purposes. Thus, in Girard Trust
Co. v. Commissioner,"s the Third Circuit upheld the exemption of a religious organization despite its activities aimed at the repeal of prohibition.
The Court recognized that abstinence from intoxicating liquors was an inherent part of the organization's religious practices of which "it is not the
business of the court either to approve or disapprove . . . so long as no
violation of secular law is involved."1 3' Similarly, in Lord's Day Alliance v.
United States, 32 opposition to legislation that would permit commercial

be attained only by legislation or a defeat of proposed legislation (for example, an organization formed primarily to promote a constitutional amendment regarding prayer in the
schools), and (2) it advocates or campaigns for the attainment of such main or primary
objective or objectives as distinguished from engaging in nonpartisan analysis, study or
research and making the results available to the public. In evaluating these characteristics,
all the surrounding facts and circumstances are to be considered. Id. §1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iv).

127. Id. §1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(ii).
128. Indeed, the Treasury has never published any official interpretation of the term

"substantial." An excerpt from the Internal Revenue Manual pinpoints the problem and

then suggests an amorphous qualitative test: "There is no simple rule as to what amount

of activities is substantial. The one case on this subject is of very limited help. The
Seasongood case held that attempts to influence legislation that constituted five percent
of total activities were not substantial. This case provides but limited guidance because

the court's view as to what sort of activities were to be measured is no longer supported
by the weight of precedent . . . .In addition, it is not clear how the five percent
figure was arrived at." Exempt Organizations Handbook, INr. REv. MANUAL 11 (671),
§764 (1972) (footnotes omitted). The Manual then advises that the central problem is
one of characterizing what activities constitute attempts to influence legislation, and
"[o]nce this determination is made, substantiality is frequently self-evident," Id,
129. TRs. REG. §l.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iii).
130. 122 F.2d 108, 1941-2 U.S.T.C. fl0,069 (3d Cir. 1941).
131. Id. at 110, 1941-2 U.S.T.C. at lO,912,
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activity on Sunday was viewed as "incidental" to the purposes of a religious
entity that was organized to promote the observance of the Sabbath.
This relative invulnerability has changed dramatically in recent years.
Prompted in large part by pressure from the executive branch and to a
lesser extent by Congress and the public, the Internal Revenue Service
has been scrutinizing the political activities of all exempt organizations
far more aggressively, and churches have not been immune. Although exemp13
tions rarely are revoked from religious groups, many have been threatened. Organized religions have reacted with an ecumenical alarm. The theme
underlying their concern is that religious organizations have a particular
social responsibility to "bear witness" to the Lord - a mission that cannot
be accomplished without active political involvement. Since their interests
inevitably are affected by government policies, religious groups urge that
they have a right to speak out on public issues, including specific legislation,
without fear of losing their tax exemption. Indeed, most groups believe
that any limitations on their political activities, even if only in the context
of denial of tax benefits, is an unconstitutional infringement upon the free
exercise of religion. A related argument is that the limitations discriminate
in favor of churches that prefer to remain silent on public issues and against
34
churches that are obliged by their faith to speak out on public issues.

132. 65 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
133. For example, in 1971 the Guild of St. Ives, a group of Episcopal attorneys in
New York, reported that I.R.S. efforts included: (a) an audit of "a major national association of churches" with respect to its political and social action involvement; (b) advice to
a major Protestant denomination that its proposed use of designated funds for a "student
political education" program would "jeopardize" its tax exempt status; (c) advice that
use of space in a Massachusetts church by a student peace group could endanger the
church's exemption; and (d) an attempt to investigate allegedly "political" activities of
a Florida church organization. Guild of St. Ives, Church Tax Exemptions and Political
Activities I (unpublished, 1971). These unnamed groups later were identified as the
National Council of Churches, the Episcopal Church of the United States, Trinity Episcopal
Church in Melrose, Massachusetts, and the Florida Migrant Ministry. See Note, Constitutional Aspects of Church Taxation, 9 COLuM. J. oF LAW AND SOC. PROB. 646 (1973), citing
Kelly, A Report to the General Board on "New Developments in the Relations Between
Church and State" (National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., unpublished,
1972). Among the targets of the now defunct Special Service Staff of the I.R.S. was
"[a] religious organization active in liberal social causes," which was believed to "use its
resources to influence legislation." Staff of Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Analysis of Political Intelligence in the
Internal Revenue Service: The Special Service Staff 42 (Comm. Print. 1974). More recently,
it has been reported that the Service has begun to investigate the political activities
of the Unification Church of America, an exempt organization under the aegis of the
controversial South Korean minister, Rev. Sun Myung Moon. BNA, DAILY TAX REPORT,
June 2, 1976.
134. See Hearings on Legislative Activity by Certain Types of Exempt Organizations
Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 13. Those groups supporting
the principles set forth in the text include: The Union of American Hebrew Congregations,
the United Synagogues of America, the Union of Orthodox Congregations of America,
the National Council of Churches, the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, The
United Methodist Church, and the United States Catholic Conference. Id.
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The Christian Echoes Case

1. Background. Virtually all of these issues converged in ChristianEchoes
National Ministry, Inc. v. United States,1 35 the only reported case in which
the revocation of a religious tax exemption has been grounded on the political
limitations in section 501(c)(3). Christian Echoes was a religious corporation
founded and led by Dr. Billy James Hargis, an ordained minister with a
right-wing bent. It described its mission in terms of a battle against Communism, Socialism and political liberalism, all of which were considered to
be atheistic world forces seeking to overthrow Christianity. Christian Echoes
sought to accomplish its mission through a barrage of publications, a nationwide network of radio and television broadcasts, evangelistic meetings, an
"Anti-Communist University," and related activities.136 Through Dr. Hargis
and its use of the media, Christian Echoes frequently took stands on public
issues ranging from prayer in the schools to the Outer Space Treaty. 37 It
also attacked specific politicians and urged the election of others, sometimes in the context of actual political campaigns, but more often as merely
part of a running commentary for and against various political personalities. 138
Christian Echoes had enjoyed tax exempt status under section 501(c)(3)
since its formation in 1958, but in 1962 it became a victim of an "Ideological
Organizations" project initiated by the Kennedy administration for the
purposes of scrutinizing the political activities of tax-exempt organizations.139
After a cumbersome audit process, during which revenue agents in the field
were overruled by the National Office of the Internal Revenue Service,
Christian Echoes' exemption was revoked with retroactive effect on three
mutually exclusive grounds: (1) it was not operated exclusively for charitable,
educational or religious purposes; (2) it had engaged in substantial attempts to
135. 470 F.2d 849, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. J9129 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864
(1973). In the spirit of full disclosure by one who might be considered, in the words of
Mr. Justice Douglas, "a special pleader," it should be revealed that, while an attorney in the
Tax Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, the author represented the government on
the appeals in Christian Echoes. See Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH.
L. Rxv. 227, 228 (1965).
136. 470 F.2d at 851-52, 855, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. at 80,079-80, 80,082. From 1961 through
1966, it spent 52% of its gross income on radio, television, publications and postage. Id.
137. Excerpts from Christian Echoes' publications illustrate its general approach. In
the May, 1962 issue of Christian Crusade magazine, for example, federal aid to education
was denounced as "nothing more than a deeply-laid Communist plot to gain control over
the minds of American youth through the medium of an all-powerful centralized Federal
government which is steadily showing increased velocity toward a Communist regime."
Brief for Appellant at 8.
138. 470 F.2d at 856, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. at 80,082. Dr. Hargis also engaged in a continuing
commentary on political personalities. In 1967, he attacked President Johnson and Senator
Robert Kennedy, characterizing them as "rich, soft-on-communism and obsessed with
power" and "Machiavellians at best and political predators at worst." Brief for Appellant
at 13. Senator J. William Fulbright was labelled "the strange-thinking Senator from
Arkansas," and a "Bleating Dove." Id. at 47, n.23.
139. See STAFF OF JoINT COMM. ON INT. RIv. TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., INVESTIGATION OF THE SPECIAL SERVICE STAFF OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,

13-14, 101-110

(Comm. Print 1975).
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influence legislation; and (3) it had participated or intervened in political
campaigns.140
2. District Court Opinion. The district court characterized Christian
Echoes as a "church" and held that it satisfied all the affirmative requirements and violated none of the limitations of section 501(c)(3). The court
narrowly construed the political limitations, finding that Christian Echoes
had neither engaged in attempts to influence legislation (except for support
of a constitutional amendment regarding prayer in the schools) nor
participated or intervened in political campaigns. It then concluded that
since all of Christian Echoes' activities had been motivated by sincere religious
convictions, the government and the courts were precluded from analyzing
those activities to determine if they were religious or political and, if political,
whether they were substantial. Based on this premise and its previous factual
findings, the court ruled that the government had revoked Christian Echoes'
exemption "without constitutionally justifiable cause, in violation of the
First Amendment ..
.-1
3. Tenth Circuit Opinion. After an abortive direct appeal to the Supreme
Court, 14 2 the government took the case to the Tenth Circuit, which reversed

on all grounds. The government cautiously attempted to avoid first amendment definitional problems by conceding that Christian Echoes was operated
exclusively for religious purposes.143 But it continued to defend revocation of
140. 470 F.2d at 852-53, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. at 80,080.
141. 28 A.F.T.R.2d 71-5260 at 71-5943-45 (N.D. Okla. 1971). The district court also
held that the Service had denied Christian Echoes due process of law under the fifth
amendment by arbitrarily selecting it from organizations engaged in similar activities
and by violating published administrative procedures in the steps leading up to the revocation.
Id. Specific reference was made to the National Council of Churches, the National
Methodist Church, and the National Presbyterian Church, all of whom were found to
have taken stands opposite to Christian Echoes, but had not been threatened with loss
of their tax exemptions. Id. at 71-5944.
142. The direct appeal, taken under 28 U.S.C. §1252, was grounded on the belief
that the district court had ruled the political limitations unconstitutional, at least insofar
as they applied to religious organizations. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court
studiously avoided entering the quagmire by interpreting the district court's opinion as
resting on a necessarily narrow construction of §501(c)(3) aimed at saving its constitutionality. The Court therefore dismissed the direct appeal for lack of jurisdiction, vacated
the judgment of the lower court and remanded for entry of a fresh decree, from which
the appeal to the Tenth Circuit was taken. 404 U.S. 561 (1972).
143. This concession put the government in the awkward position of repudiating its
own regulations, which reflect the view that the political limitations were intended to
merely clarify restrictions on political activity that had always been implicit in the
definition of an exempt purpose. See text accompanying notes 114-116, 127 supra. The
regulations provide that an organization will not be regarded as operated exclusively for
exempt purposes if it is an "action organization" - that is, if it violates the limitations
on influencing legislation or intervention in political campaigns. TREAs. REG. §1.501(C)(3)l(c)(3)(i). It would follow, as Christian Echoes strenuously argued, that a concession as to
an organization's exclusively religious purposes would necessarily bar denial of its exemption on the ground that the political limitations had been violated. The government
responded by construing the political limitations as "independent of and in addition to"
the affirmative requirement. for exemption. Reply Br. for Appellant 3-4. Under this
approach, which is more defensible than the tack taken by the regulation, a religious group
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the exemption on the basis of the political limitations. In an opinion that
went beyond what even the government had urged, the court of appeals held
that Christian Echoes' religious motivation was irrelevant in construing the
limitations; that the limitation on attempts to influence legislation should be
broadly construed so as to embrace even indirect appeals to the general
public on issues of the day; that Christian Echoes' activities in this regard,
viewed in light of a balancing test, were substantial; and that the limitation
of political campaign intervention was intended to proscribe open criticism
of public officials, even those who might not be running in a particular
political campaign.- The court then rejected the district court's constitutional analysis, holding that the political limitations did not violate the free
exercise clause or any other first amendment rights, and that the government had not arbitrarily discriminated against Christian Echoes by revoking
its exemption while leaving other politically active churches untouched.145
Apart from constitutional considerations, the result reached by the court
of appeals seems inescapable even if its rationale may be questioned in
certain respects. The court was analytically correct in declining to give
undue emphasis to Christian Echoes' concededly religious motivation for
political action. 4 6 In light of the government's concession, the question in
the case was no longer whether Christian Echoes was exclusively religious,
but whether it had violated the specific political limitations. Any approach
under which application of those limitations turned on motivation would
permit an organization that engaged solely in political action to qualify
for exempt status merely by showing that its activities were in furtherance of
sincere religious beliefs.
The court's broad construction of the lobbying limitation is somewhat
more troublesome. Analogous authorities support the view that the limitations were intended to prohibit grassroots lobbying as well as direct dealings
with legislators. 47 But the court went unnecessarily far in equating the
phrase "attempting to . . . influence legislation" with any expression of
whose political activities were motivated by sincere religious convictions would qualify
for exempt status unless its activities were of such a nature that they violated the

provisos in §501(c)(3).
144. 470 F.2d at 854-56, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 19129 at 80,081-82.
145. Id. at 857-58, 1973-I U.S.T.C. at 80,082-84.
146. See text accompanying notes 120-121, supra.

147. See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), 1959-1 U.S.T.C. %9262 where
in the context of denying an ordinary and necessary business deduction for grassroots lobbying
expenses, the Supreme Court held that such efforts could not be subsidized through tax
benefits under a "sharply defined policy." Id. at 512. See also Textile Mills Securities Corp.
v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941), 1941-2 U.S.T.C. 9784. If anything, Congress has
treated grassroots lobbying more stringently than direct lobbying. Since 1962, for example,
business expenses for lobbying may be deducted so long as they are directly related to
the activities of the business, but grassroots lobbying expenses may not be deducted. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §162(e). Cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§4945(d), (e) (imposing excise
tax on certain expenditures incurred by private foundations; phrase "to carry on propaganda,
or otherwise attempt, to influence legislation" defined to include "any attempt to influence
any legislation through an attempt to affect the opinion of the general public or any
segment thereof.").
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opinion on a public issue, including those where no specific legislation
was pending. As the Supreme Court recognized in Walz v. Tax Commission,
churches frequently take stands on public issues.148 But such stands, by
themselves, need not violate section 501(c)(3) unless they are aimed at
specific legislation and, even then, an exemption may not be revoked unless
such activities are substantial. 14 9 The difficulty, of course, is in drawing the
line between expressions of church policy and continuous efforts to promote
or defeat specific legislation. The Treasury has no obligation to subsidize
the latter through tax benefits, even to religious organizations. But the court
was not faced with a line drawing problem in Christian Echoes, where the
group's activities in the area of grassroots lobbying were a regular and
continuous part of its overall program.
The court's construction of the campaign intervention clause is also
unnecessarily broad in some respects. In alluding to Christian Echoes'
criticism of President Kennedy in 1961, for example, the court suggested
that the term "candidate for public office" could be expanded to embrace
incumbents in the public eye who had not yet announced their re-election
plans. A plain reading of the statute would not justify such breadth, although
in practical terms it could be argued that any first-term President becomes
a candidate for re-election at the instant of his inauguration. The same
would be true in the case of congressional candidates. On the other hand,
the court's decision to equate opposition to one candidate with intervention
on behalf of his opponent is warranted, even if it involves an extension of
the statutory language. Any more flexible standard, such as the district
court's requirement of formal corporate endorsement of a specific candidate,
would exalt substance over form- a concept traditionally inimical to the
proper functioning of the tax laws. Nor was the court misguided in attributing
Dr. Hargis' personal endorsements to the organization. Since the facts revealed
that he was Christian Echoes' founder, president and chief spokesman, the
court could hardly ignore him, but its decision need not be read as jeopardizing
the exemption of a church whose pastor decides personally to endorse or
oppose a political candidate.
4. Constitutional Questions. Church groups generally were distressed
by the Tenth Circuit's expansive statutory construction of the political limitations in Christian Echoes, but they reserved their principal concern for the
court's constitutional holdings. Joining in an odd alliance with Dr. Hargis,
most major Protestant and Jewish organizations urged the Supreme Court
to grant certiorari on these points, but once again the Court demurred.150

148. 397 U.s. at 670 (1970).
149. In interpreting the term "substantial" as requiring a balancing test, the court
of appeals adopted what is perhaps the only workable solution in the context of a particular
case. But this is no solace to churches and other exempt organizations who would prefer
some more definitive guidance on what is permitted by the statute.
150. 414 U.S. 864 (1973). Briefs amicus curiae were filed in support of Christian Echoes'
petition by the National Council of Churches (on behalf of itself and other major

Protestant groups) and the United Synagogue of America, representing several leading
Jewish organizations.
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The wide range of constitutional questions raised by the limitations has
been thoroughly canvassed elsewhere.' 51 Stripped of detail, the major objections may be summarized as follows:
1. As applied generally, the limitations violate the first amendment rights of free speech and freedom to petition. More particularly,
they are unconstitutional insofar as the government conditions a
benefit upon the willingness of a charity and its contributors to surrender
a first amendment
right without justifying such action by a compelling
152
national policy.
2. As applied to religious organizations, the limitations violate
the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment in
that they: (a) discriminate in favor of those religions that refrain
from becoming involved in issues of public concern, thereby destroying
governmental neutrality toward religion; (b) necessitate excessive surveillance and entanglement by the government in the affairs of religious groups; and (c) impinge upon the free exercise rights of
politically active religions by making the sacrifice of these rights a
condition for tax benefits. 53
3. The limitations are void for vagueness and overbreadth. The
major uncertainty is the meaning of the term "substantial," but similar
ambiguities stem from the phrases "carrying on propaganda," "attempting to influence legislation," and "participate in . . . any political
campaign." The net effect is that an organization is left without any
guidelines as to permissible conduct, thereby chilling their exercise
of first amendment rights.-M
4. The limitations violate the equal protection notions inherent
in the due process clause of the fifth amendment insofar as they discriminate between charities (including churches) with substantial
legislative activities and those without them. In addition, the substantial
test discriminates on the basis of size and wealth by allowing a large
organization, such as the Roman Catholic Church, to devote considerable
time and money to legislative involvement while jeopardizing the
exemption of a smaller group that may engage in far fewer political
activities in an absolute sense.' 55
All these arguments are compelling, and it is unfortunate that the Supreme
Court has not agreed to consider them. If it had, however, the Court might
well have reached the same conclusions as the Tenth Circuit, although a
more precise rationale would have been desirable. The Court's decisions interpreting the religion clauses are far from consistent, but it has upheld
analogous restrictions on religious conduct and belief if they are mandated
151.

See Troyer, supra note 107, Note, supra note 107, at 409-22; Note, supra note 133, at

659-71. Cf. Cooper, supra note 113, at 835-41.
152. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Troyer, supra note 107, at
1425-51.
153. See Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari for National Council
of the Churches of Christ, et al., As Amici Curiae at 8-21, Christian Echoes National

Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
154. See Troyer, supra note 107, at 1456-58.
155. Id. at 1451-56. See also "Americans United," Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169,
1181, 1978-1 U.S.T.C. 9165, at 80,223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1973), revd sub. nom. Alexander v.
"Americans United," Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. J9439 (1974).
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156
by a neutral statutory scheme grounded on purely secular considerations.
The political limitations arguably satisfy this neutrality test in that they
deny tax benefits to a broad category of charitable organizations, both religious
and secular, whose common denominator is the pursuit of specified political
activities that Congress has chosen not to subsidize through tax deductions.
The excessive entanglement argument may have been answered in part
by Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Walz v. Tax Commission.157 Justice Harlan observed that if the New York property tax statute
involved in Walz had been framed more narrowly to include only charities
and churches engaging in substantial charitable activity, first amendment problems might be presented. But as a general matter, he saw no constitutional
difficulties with a state evaluating "the scope of charitable activities in pro-

portion to doctrinal pursuits ..

. [because] it does not entail judicial inquiry

into dogma or belief."'' 5 8 Of course, the validity of this analysis may turn on
the manner in which the particular statute is administered. Barring that
problem, the factual determinations required by the political limitations
should not offend the first amendment even though the Internal Revenue
Service would be required to identify certain political activities in which a
church might be engaging.
The free exercise question is somewhat more vexing, and the Tenth Circuit
treated it far too casually in Christian Echoes, particularly by emphasizing
that tax exemptions are not a right but merely a matter of legislative grace.
The "right-privilege" distinction has long been discredited when first amendment rights are at stake.' 9 But the question remains: Do the limitations really
impinge upon the free exercise of any group's religion? As a practical matter,
the answer is no. If properly construed, the limitations do not affect religious
groups that take public stands on controversial issues. Religions that do
some lobbying should not be endangered, since comparatively little of
their time and money is devoted to the specific types of activities proscribed
by the statute. Even religious organizations like Christian Echoes, which
are constrained by their faith to emulate political action agencies, are in
no way precluded from influencing legislation or intervening in political
campaigns. They simply must do so without the indirect support of the tax
system. Finally, a church that exceeds the limitations still may qualify as a
"social welfare" organization under section 501(c)(4) of the Code. As such,
it would be exempt from income taxation, but contributions to it would
not be deductible. At the same time, purely sacerdotal functions and charitable
activities could still be conducted by a separate sister organization that would
fully qualify for tax exempt status under section 501(c)(3).160
156. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961).
157. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
158. Id. at 697-98, n.l.
159. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
160. See TREAS. REG. §1.501(c)(3)1(c)(3)(v). Many organizations that have been
threatened with revocation of their exemption have chosen to divide up their activities,
spinning off charitable pursuits to a new §501(c)(3) organization while lobbying under the
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Indeed, it is conceivable that greater constitutional questions might be
raised if the political limitations were not applied to religious organizations.
In that event, the political interests of churches would be promoted by
according tax advantages that generally would be unavailable to other nonexempt groups whose views might differ from the churches. This fear was
cogently expressed by the Guild of St. Ives, a group of Episcopal laymen,
who support the right of churches to take public stands without loss of tax
benefits, but nonetheless concede:
The merits of denying tax benefits to political activities may be
debated. Given the Congressional policy against such benefits, however,
it is hard to quarrel with the limitation imposed on exempt organizations by Section 501(c)(3) .... In a pluralistic and democratic society,
the church's voice is but one of many, and any system which promotes
the political interests of the church by according tax advantages for
political activities not available to others generally should not be
tolerated.1 01
Far more profound questions are raised by the more generalized constitutional objections to the limitations. At one time, it appeared that the
Supreme Court had settled these matters when in Cammarano v. United
States,'6 2 it upheld the constitutionality of Treasury Regulations denying
business deductions for lobbying expenses. The Court justified its decision
on a "sharply defined policy" against subsidizing political activities, but
subsequent developments have undermined the Court's premise. 16 The
vagueness argument also has assumed considerable merit in light of the undisputed difficulties that have arisen in defining the scope of the limitations.- 0
Finally, recent revelations concerning the selective enforcement of the exempt
organizations statutes by the Internal Revenue Service strengthen the equal
protection argument. 165
aegis of a social welfare entity. Christian Echoes followed this route, even before its
litigation terminated, by forming the Church of the Christian Crusade and the School of
the Christian Crusade, both of which are exempt from tax and eligible to receive deductible
charitable contributions. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INT. REV. TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D
SEss., IssuEs RELATING TO EXEMPT ORGANIZATION "LOBBYING"- H.R. 13500 at 10-11 (Comm.
Print 1976).
161. Guild of St. Ives, supra note 133, at 8.
162. 358 U.S. 498, 1959-1 U.S.T.C. 9262 (1959); accord, F. Strauss & Son, Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 498, 1959-1 U.S.T.C. %9262 (1959) (companion case).
163. 358 U.S. at 512, 1959-1 U.S.T.C. at 71,560. The most significant of these develop-

ments was the congressional decision in 1962 to partially overrule Cammarano by permitting
a business deduction for all direct lobbying expenses. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §162(e).
See also Troyer, supra note 107, at 1430-37. On the other hand, the Court recently reaffirmed
the provisions of the Hatch Act, alluded to by the Tenth Circuit in Christian Echoes, that
prevent federal employees from engaging in plainly identifiable political activities. See United
States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Assoc. of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548,
557-67 (1973).
164. This argument would be undercut if the regulations were deemed sufficiently
specific to cure any ambiguities arising out of the statute. Cf. United States Civil Service
Comm'n v. National Assoc. of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 568-81 (1973).
165. See Center on Corporate Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863, 1974-1
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Despite all of these considerations, the courts have been reluctant to
take these constitutional questions very seriously, 166 and the Supreme Court
seems determined to avoid them altogether. Charities therefore turned
to Congress for relief, and it is not surprising that in the course of the
legislative deliberations, churches sought and were granted preferred treatment insofar as the political limitations are concerned.
D.

The Conable Bill

The issues raised in Christian Echoes demonstrate that the political
limitations, however they were construed, were unsatisfactory. The problems
are not unique to churches. All public charities were affected by the uncertainties and constitutional defects in the law, and there no longer seemed
to be any defensible policy for removing such a diverse and vital category
of organizations from participation in the legislative process. 61 7 The need
for reform was accentuated by the imbalance between charities and other
interested groups that seek to influence legislation. Businesses may deduct
their direct lobbying expenses, 168 members of trade associations and labor
unions may deduct their dues, 169 and some nonprofit organizations- in
particular, veterans organizations and lodges- qualify to receive deductible
contributions notwithstanding their lobbying activities.17 ° But a charity was
not allowed the same freedom without endangering its special tax exempt
status under section 501(c)(3).
Recognizing these concerns, Congress enacted a major amendment,
commonly known as the Conable Bill, as part of the Tax Reform Act of
1976.11' The enactment represents a significant reform of the restrictions on
lobbying by public charities, but has not altered the law for churches, conventions or associations of churches or their integrated auxiliaries.
U.S.T.C.

9118 (D.D.C. 1974);

1ST

INVESTIGATION

SESS.,

STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INT. REV. TAXATION,

OF THE SPECIAL

SERVICE

STAFF

OF

THE

INTERNAL

94TH CONG.,

REVENUE

SERVICE

(Comm. Print 1975).
166. See, e.g., Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1147-50, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. 9591
at 84,903-05 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975). All of the major challenges
to the lobbying limitations are being advanced in a suit brought by Taxation with
Representation, a public interest taxpayer's lobby that is currently classified as a §501(c)(4)
social welfare organization. The district court dismissed the suit, summarily rejecting the
group's constitutional arguments. Taxation with Representation v. United States, 1976-2
U.S.T.C. 9693 (E.D. Va. 1976). The case has been appealed. See 4 TAX NOTES No. 45 at

14 (1976).
167. This viewpoint was recently expressed in the report of the Commission on Private
Philanthropy and Public Needs (known as the Filer Commission), which recommended
that "nonprofit organizations, other than foundations, be allowed the same freedoms to
attempt to influence legislation as are business corporations and trade associations." Report
of Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, GIVING IN AMERICA 181 (1975).
168. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §162(e).
169. TREAS. REG. §1.162-20(c)(3).
170. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §170(c)(3)-(4). See also Troyer, supra note 107, at 1438-41.

171. Pub. L. No. 94-455. The bill is named after its sponsor, Rep. Barber Conable
of New York. For a thorough analysis of the new amendment, see Washburn, Lobbying by
Public Charities to Elect or Not Elect, 4 TAX NOTES No. 44 at 3-12 (1976).
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Passage of the Conable bill culminated a tortured seven year history during
which religious organizations gradually sought and achieved unique status.
It emanated from a 1969 American Bar Association resolution that would
have permitted public charities to make direct communications with legislative bodies without loss of tax exempt status or eligibility to receive deductible
contributions. 172 Legislation based on this resolution was introduced in 1971
by Senator Edmund Muskie and Representative James Symington.7 " None of
these proposals made any special reference to churches.
The Muskie-Symington bill went through a period of coimpromise and
refinement, emerging in March of 1972 as H.R. 13720, a far more complex
measure sponsored principally by Representative Al Ullman of Oregon. 7 4
The Ullman bill permitted public charities to remain subject to present law
or elect to be governed by a set of percentage limitations. An electing
charity's exemption would not be jeopardized provided that its total expenditures to "influence legislation" did not exceed 20 percent of its total annual
disbursements for exempt purposes. However, of the 20 percent generally
permitted, an amount equal to 5 percent of charitable disbursements could
be devoted to attempts to influence the general public (so called "grassroots
lobbying") and attempts to influence legislation not directly relating to a
charitable purpose of the organization. The election was made available to
75
all public charities, including churches.1
Although most charities responded favorably to the Ullman bill, religious
organizations were equivocal. At extensive hearings held in May 1972, most
major churches expressed their opposition to any restrictions or limitations
on their legislative activity. They viewed the Ullman bill as an improvement over existing law, but the consensus was that it did not go far enough
for churches and ultimately would raise more problems than it solved. The
National Council of Churches proposed that the restriction on influencing
legislation be excised from the statute and, in the alternative, suggested that
the unique constitutional status of churches entitled them to a special provision to that effect.' 7 6 Leading Jewish groups and the Baptist Joint Committee
for Public Affairs commended Congress for its concern, but opposed the
Ullman bill as an unwarranted affront to first amendment freedoms. 77 The
United States Catholic Conference flatly opposed the bill primarily on the
ground that its new percentage tests and definitional distinctions would give
172. See Council and Committee Recommendations, 21 TAX LAW. 967, 969 (1968).
173. S. 1408, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 11594, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
174. H.R. 13720, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See also Hearings on Legislative Activity,
supra note 13, at 2-4.
175. The bill also provided a specific definition of "influencing legislation" which made
it clear that there were no restrictions on an organization's making available the results
of non-partisan analysis, study or research or providing technical assistance to a governmental body or committee on written request. It also sanctioned, without limitation,
lobbying activities in regard to matters that might affect the existence of the organization,
its exempt status, or its eligibility to receive deductible contributions. Id.
176. Hearings on Legislative Activity, supra note 13, at 194-200.
177. Id. at 88, 282-83. A group of Jewish charitable agencies, however, supported the
bill. Id. at 87-106, 286-87.
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rise to an excessive entanglement of government in religious matters. It
urged the Congress to simply exempt churches from any limitations on legislative activity.178
The Ullman bill ultimately died in Committee, but when it reappeared
in 1973,179 many public charities objected to several new features that had
been inserted. Further discussions led to the introduction in late 1973 of a
compromise measure by Representative Barber Conable with the assistance
of the Coalition of Concerned Charities, a diverse group that had been
organized for the purpose of finding a suitable solution to the problem. This
bill was reintroduced in the 1974 session and was tentatively approved by the
0
House Ways and Means Committee during its tax reform deliberations1s
But the final draft of the bill troubled its original supporters, and it was
8
withdrawn at the request of Representative Conable.' '
During the birth and death of these various measures, churches persisted
in their requests for special treatment. With the introduction in June 1975
of yet another Conable bill,1 82 it was believed that agreement finally had
been reached. Like its predecessors, this bill provided that a specific proportion of an electing charity's budget could be expended for "influencing
legislation." The proportions decreased as the total annual budget increased,
with an overall limit of $1 million. Most section 501(c)(3) charities were
given the right to elect coverage under the new provisions, but in response
to a concern expressed at the 1972 hearings, churches were expressly denied
the election, leaving them subject to present law. The bill also provided
that the definitions and expenditure limits approach would not affect the
manner in which section 501(c)(3) would be applied to organizations, such
as churches, which were ineligible to elect (or chose not to elect) to come
under the new rules. 83
Much to the surprise of Representative Conable, religious organizations

178. Id. at 307-12.
179. H.R. 5095, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The major changes were a reverse
graduation provision to prevent a huge expenditure of funds by large organizations, and
a penalty clause that fined charities that exceeded the proscribed percentage of legislative
activities in addition to revoking their §501(c)(3) exemption.
180.
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FOR

MEANS,

DRAFTING
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2D SESs.,
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DESCRIPTION
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17-18

(Comm. Print 1974).
181.

STAFF OF JT. COMM. ON

INT.

REV.

93D CONG.,

TAX.,

2D SESS., TAX REFORM

OF 1974, TENTATIVE DECISIONS OF THE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE SINCE
CORRESPONDING TO SECTIONS OF DRAFT BILL 12 (Comm. Print 1974).
182. H.R. 8021, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). An identical bill was
Senator Muskie. See S. 2832, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Later in 1975,
liberal bill, along the lines of the recommendation of the Filer Commission,

SEPT. 11,

BILL

1974,

introduced by
an even more
was introduced

by Representative Richard L. Ottinger. See H.R. 9256, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
183. See The Effect of H.R. 8021 on Churches: A Case for Passage [hereinafter Effect

of H.R. 8021 on Churches], Statement from firm of Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz on behalf
of Coalition of Concerned Charities (unpublished, Nov. 11, 1975); STAFF OF JT. COMM.
ON INT. REV. TAX,

IssUES RELATING TO EXEMPT

ORGANIZATION

"LOBBYING"-

H.R. 13500,

supra note 160, at 9-10.
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came forward with still more objections.- s They maintained that any legislation which continued to subject churches to limits on lobbying activities would
result in government defining their religious mission, thus violating the
principle of separation of church and state. By remaining subject to present
law, as the Conable bill provided, churches believed that they would be
acquiescing to an unacceptable restriction. More particularly, they feared
that under the "reenactment" doctrine, passage of the bill would amount
to statutory approval of the Christian Echoes decision. To meet this concern,
some churches once again requested a provision specifically excluding them
8
from any limitations on influencing legislation.
In an effort to meet these new concerns, the interested parties agreed to
insert language in the proposed committee report in an attempt to negate
the possibility that the reenactment doctrine might be applied so as to
ratify Christian Echoes. Language was drafted by the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation stating in effect that the Congress was aware of
the criticisms leveled at the Christian Echoes decision and that the bill
should not be interpreted as ratifying that case or earlier opinions leading
to the decision.' s0
The initial reaction of major church groups to this language was that
it did not solve their problems. 87 As a result of this and other objections, the
Conable bill went through still another metamorphosis, emerging anew in

mid-1976 as H.R. 13500,'11 a complex 25 page provision that is the very
antithesis of tax simplification. Like most of its predecessors, H.R. 13500
permitted an electing charity to be governed by objective dollar expenditure
tests and it established a reverse graduation feature so that as a charity's
budget becomes larger, a smaller percentage may be spent on legislation.
Within the total permitted expenditure level, no more than 25 percent may
be devoted to grassroots lobbying. The bill also provided that an organization will incur an excise tax if it violates the expenditure limits. The extreme
sanction of loss of exemption was reserved for situations where over four consecutive years, the organization exceeds the permitted limits by more than
50 percent. 8 9
184. See Conable, Weaving Webs: Lobbying by Charities, reprinted in 3 TAx NOTES
No. 45 at 27-28 (1975).
185. See Effect of H.R. 8021 on Churches, supra note 183. Churches did not request
an exemption from the prohibition against political campaign intervention.
186. Hamilton, Recent Developments in Legislation, Particularly the Conable Bill, in
SIXTH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 80, at 223.
187. See Letter from James A. Hamilton (National Council of Churches), John W.
Baker (Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs), and James L. Robinson (U.S. Catholic
Conference) to Hon. Barber Conable, Oct. 1, 1975. (This letter was made available to the
author by counsel to the Coalition of Concerned Charities).
188. H.R. 13500, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
189. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1210, 94th Cong., 2d Ses. 1-17 (1976); S. REP. No.
94-938 (Part 2), 94th Cong., 2d Ses. 79-85 (1976). Among other things, the bill also
provided that an organization that is eligible to elect coverage under the new rules may
not become a social welfare organization under §501(c)(4) if it loses its charity status
because of excessive lobbying. This provision does not apply to churches, however, since
they are ineligible to elect. H.R. REP. No. 94-1210 'at 14; S. REP. No. 94-938 (Part 2) at 83.
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The new bill once again isolated churches from its impact. At the specific
request of representatives of leading denominations, a "church or a convention or association of churches (or an integrated auxiliary or a member of
an affiliated group which includes a church, etc.)" may not elect coverage.
The bill also provided that the new rules are not to affect the way in which
the existing limitations (e.g., the "substantial" test of section 501(c)(3)) are
applied to churches, 190 and contained a highly unusual "rule of interpretation" clause which explicitly negated any approval or disapproval of the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Christian Echoes or earlier opinions. 191
The revised Conable bill was approved unanimously by the House Ways
and Means Committee and wended its way through the Senate Finance
Committee, where it was added to the Tax Reform Act of 1976.102
Churches and their related entities (but not some other religious organizations) therefore remain subject to existing law. If churches had been covered
by the new rules, serious first amendment questions might have been raised
in light of the excessive entanglement that might result from enforcement
of the expenditure limitations. But similar problems may well be raised by
singling out churches for special treatment. One message of Walz v. Tax
Commission 93 was that religious tax exemptions are constitutional because
religious organizations are part of a broad class of benefited public charities.
When the tax exemption statutes use religion as a basis for making distinctions among charitable organizations, the rational of Walz is threatened.For the time being, these issues must remain unresolved; unless the Service
revokes the exemption of a church, as it did in Christian Echoes, the uncertainties are destined to remain.
III.

THE DISCRIMINATORY RELIGIOUS SCHOOL

During most of our income tax history, charitable organizations remained
eligible for favored tax treatment even if they discriminated on the basis
190. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1210, supra note 189, at 15-16. The House Committee
report made it clear that the term "integrated auxiliary" was intended to include

theological seminaries, religious youth organizations and men's fellowship associations
which are affiliated with churches, but did not embrace hospitals, grade schools, orphanages
and old-age homes that are established without regard to church relationships. Members of
this latter category might be excluded from election under the bill, however, if they
were a member organization of an affiliated group that included a church. Id. at 16. The
Senate report, however, declined to comment on the definition of "integrated auxiliary."

191. H.R. 13500, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), §l(c). Language similar to that proposed
to accompany H.R. 8021, see text accompanying note 186 supra, was provided in the
committee report. H.R. REP. No. 94-1210, supra, note 189 at 16-17.
192. See H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., §2512 (as amended by Senate Finance
Committee, July 20, 1976); S. REP. No. 94-938 (Part 2), supra note 189, at 79-85. At that

point, church groups took a neutral stand on the bill, provided that it was not
amended in a manner that might be harmful to them. See Statement of James E. Wood,
Jr. (Executive Director, Baptist Joint Comm. on Public Affairs), on H.R. 13500, to House
Ways and Means Committee (May 12, 1976).
193. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
194. See text accompanying notes 32-51 supra.
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of race. In the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education, 95 however, the
Internal Revenue Service began to reevaluate its position. After a period of
indecision, it ruled that racially discriminatory private schools would be
ineligible for federal tax exemption and deductibility of contributions. 9 6
19
More recently, the Service explicitly extended this policy to church schools,'
but the scope of this thorny new limitation on religious tax exemptions is
still unsettled.

A.

Background

The impetus for affirmative action through the tax system was provided
by the surge of requests for section 501(c)(3) status from segregated private
schools which had been formed in response to Brown and its progeny.1 98
The Service first stated its policy in 1967, when it announced that tax
benefits would be denied to segregated private schools if the operation of
the school was otherwise unconstitutional by virtue of state involvement.- 99
Absent the degree of involvement that would constitute "state action" for
constitutional purposes, schools remained eligible for tax exempt status.
The question thus remained whether exemptions should also be denied
to segregated private schools whose operations might not be "otherwise
unconstitutional because of state involvement." In the early months of the
Nixon administration, the Service was unwilling to extend its policy that
far. But the situation changed when black parents of children attending
public schools in Mississippi brought a suit to enjoin Treasury officials from
according tax exemption or approving charitable deductions to any private
school in Mississippi which discriminated against blacks. In Green v.
Kennedy,200 a three-judge court found that substantial constitutional questions were raised by the suit and issued a preliminary injunction restraining
the Treasury and the Service from approving any further applications for
exemption from private schools in Mississippi unless it first determined
that they were not operated on a discriminatory basis. Following this decision,
the Service changed its position, stating for the first time that it no longer
201
could justify allowing tax exempt status to discriminatory private schools.

195.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

196. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 Cum. BULL. 230.
197. Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 Cum. BULL. 158.
198. See generally Note, Federal Tax Benefits to Segregated Private Schools, 68 COLUM.
L. REv. 922 (1968).
199. IRS News Release, Aug. 2, 1967, 7 CCH 1967 STAND. FmD. TAX RFP. 6734. At
about the same time, the Service ruled that a community recreational facility the use
of which was restricted on the basis of race would not qualify to receive tax-deductible
contributions because it was not "charitable" within the generally accepted meaning of
that term. Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 113.
200. 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 9176 (D.D.C. 1970), continued sub. nom.
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. 9529 (D.D.C. 1971), af'd sub. nom.
Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997, 1972-1 U.S.T.C. 9123A (1971).
201. IRS News Release, July 10, 1970, 7 CCH 1970 STAND. FED, TAX REP. 6790.
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It later amplified its statement by announcing that its position "would be
20 2
applicable to all private schools, whether church related or not."
Despite the Service's change of heart, the Green litigation proceeded,
complicated by the intervention of parents and children who supported or
attended private segregated Mississippi schools. In its final opinion, the court
held that in light of the settled federal policy against support for racial
segregation of schools, public or private, the Internal Revenue Code could
no longer be construed to extend section 501(c)(3) tax status to racially discriminatory private schools.203 The court also concluded that denial of tax
benefits was required on the ground that discriminatory schools were not
"charitable" under the common law of trusts since they were operated for
20 4
a purpose contrary to public policy.

The intervenors in Green had argued that the right of educational institutions to tax exemptions and deductions stood on the same constitutional
plane as that of religious organizations, and that if the Service were to deny
their exemptions, it would be compelled to do the same to church schools.
Although it was not obliged to do so, the court accepted this invitation to
enter the religious thicket, noting at the outset that the first amendment
required minimal government involvement with and ensured freedom of
religious schools from government restrictions. 20 5 But it went on to suggest
that in some circumstances these religious values might be required to give
way to the strong governmental interest in avoiding racial discrimination.20a
The intervenors appealed Green to the Supreme Court, which summarily
affirmed without elaboration. 20 7 At the same time, the Service reasserted that
private schools would not qualify for exemption unless they demonstrated
a racially nondiscriminatory policy. 20 8 Religious schools were not mentioned
specifically, but there was no indication that they would be granted any
special immunity, even if their tenets required them to discriminate.
B.

Applying the Policy to Religious Institutions

By the end of 1970, the Service began to request all tax-exempt private
202. IRS News Release, July 19, 1970, 7 CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6814.
203. Green v. Connally, 35;0 F. Supp. 1150, 1161-64, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. 9529, at 87,149-51
(D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub. nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997, 1972-1 U.S.T.C. 9123A (1971).
204. Id. at 1157-61, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. at 87,146-49.
205. Id. at 1168-69, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. at 87,154-55.
206. Id. at 1169, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. at 87,155. The court observed that the question was
hypothetical and might never arise, but added that "if it ever does arise it will have
to be considered in the light of the particular facts and issue presented, and in light
of the established rule . . .that the law may prohibit an individual from taking certain
actions even though his religion commands or prescribes them." Id.
207. 404 U.S. 997 (1971). The Court was later to observe that "[t]he question of
whether a segregative private school qualifies under §501(c)(3) has not received plenary
review in this Court" and that because the government had reversed its position in the
Green litigation, "the Court's affirmance in Green lacks the precedential weight of a
case involving a truly adversary controversy." Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 740
n.ll (1974). This is a somewhat curious statement int light of the genuinely adversarial
position taken by the white intervenors in Green.
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schools to furnish proof of a nondiscriminatory admissions policy. One
affected party was Bob Jones University, a South Carolina religious college
devoted to the propagation of its fundamentalist tenets, including the belief
that God intended the various races of man to live separate and apart. In
keeping with this belief, the University prohibited its students from dating
or marrying members of another race under penalty of expulsion.209
The University refused to change its policy, prompting the Service to
commence procedures for revocation of its exemption. But these proceedings
were halted when the University filed suit to enjoin the Service from revoking
its tax-exempt status on the ground that such action would violate a variety
of the University's constitutional rights, including the right to the free exercise
210
of its religion.

A sensitive constitutional clash between the first and fourteenth amendment was squarely framed by the University's challenge, but the case was
not destined to reach the merits. It became entangled in a procedural controversy involving the question whether the relief sought by the University
was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act 211 and the Declaratory Judgment
Act. 212 This issue worked its way to the Supreme Court, which denied injunctive relief.213 In so doing, the Court had no occasion to pass upon the

merits other than to suggest that the University's "First Amendment, due
process, and equal protection contentions are sufficiently debatable to fore208. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 Cum. BULL. 280. Similar to previous IRS statements,
the ruling was predicated on the theory that discriminatory schools did not satisfy the
critical "charitable" requirement. See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
209. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 734-35, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 19488, at
84,097 (1974).
210. Id. at 735-86, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,097.
211. INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, §7421(a). The Act provides, with exceptions not here
relevant, that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of
any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person." See Note, Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, Section 7421(a), The Anti-Injunction Act: Judicial Muzzle Makes for
Service Muscle, 27 U. FLA. L. RV. 414 (1975).
212. 28 U.S.C. §2201 (1970). This Act bans suits "with respect to Federal Taxes."
The district court in Bob Jones granted the University's request, finding that the AntiInjunction Act did not apply because the suit challenged the constitutionality of the
Service's nondiscrimination requirement. Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 841 F. Supp. 277,
1972-1 U.S.T.C. 9245 (D.S.C. 1971). The Fourth Circuit reversed, creating a conflict on
the procedural questions with a decision of the District of Columbia Circuit. Compare
Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 472 F.2d 903, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 9185, reh. denied, 476 F.2d
259, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 19806 (4th Cir. 1978), with "Americans United," Inc. v. Walters, 477
F.2d 1169, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 9165 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also Crenshaw County Private School
Foundation v. Connally, 474 F.2d 1185, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 9287 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 908 (1974), in which injunctive relief was denied in similar circumstances. The
school in 'Crenshaw was also religious in nature, but it did not appear to base its
discriminatory policy on any particular tenets. Id. at 1186, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. at 80,580.
213. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9488 (1974). See also
Alexander v. "Americans United," Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9439 (1974); Note,
Anti-Injunction Act, supra note 211, at 422-53. Under certain circumstances, charities
may now go to court and seek a declaratory judgment as to their tax-exempt status. See
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §7248, added by §1806(a), Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pusb, L. No.
94-455.
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close any notion that 'under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail .... ,214
In Bob Jones, the Service was not confronted with a typical religious
school, but rather an organization self-styled as "'the world's most unusual
university.' "215 But parochial schools are common in the United States, and
some may discriminate either on the basis of religion itself or on both
religious and racial grounds. 216 Indeed, some faiths, like the Black Muslims,
limit their membership on racial grounds, and others, like the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, have tenets that include a belief that
blacks are inferior.217 And virtually all religions have to some degree discriminated on the basis of sex. Do current notions of public policy require
the denial of tax benefits to these groups unless they alter their tenets? Is
withdrawal of their exemptions constitutionally required? Or is the conditioning of tax benefits in this manner constitutionally precluded?
These delicate questions hardly seem within the province of the revenue
authorities, but the continued use of the tax laws as an instrument of social
policy makes them unavoidable. The Internal Revenue Service is beginning
to supply answers. In Revenue Ruling 75-231, the Service announced that
it would revoke the exempt status and the right to receive deductible contributions from church schools that practice racially discriminatory policies. 2 ' 8
The ruling posed three situations: (1) a separately incorporated school
organized under the auspices of a church; (2) a church with a full complement of religious functions, including a religious school that was not separately
incorporated; and (3) a similar church operating two schools, one of which
was separately incorporated. The programs of each school complied with
state law requirements for public education, but also included religious
services and devotion of time to religious themes. All the schools refused to
accept children from certain racial and ethnic groups, but only the church
in "situation
3" asserted that discrimination was required by the tenets of
2 19
its religion

The ruling is based on the familiar premise that a school or college
which practices racial discrimination is not "charitable" because its activities
are contrary to public policy. Since the term "charitable" has been authori214. 416 U.S. at 749, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,102. The merits finally have been reached
in tax refund suits recently filed by Bob Jones University and other religiously affiliated
private schools. See, e.g., Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, No. 75-0020Civ.-8 (E.D.N.C.); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, Civ. No. 76-775 (D.S.C.).
215. Id. at 734, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,097.
216. It is well known that the pressure to integrate public schools in the South
led to the growth of all-white private academies. In an attempt to avoid the revocation
of tax benefits mandated by Green v. Connally, many of these schools became church
affiliated. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 467, n.9 (1973); L. PFEFER, supra note
2, at 246; Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436 (1973).

217. L.

PFEFFER,

supra note 2, at 302.

218. Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 CUM. BULL. 158. The Service also announced that it
would apply this ruling "with full regard to the de minimus rule" normally applied in
connection with exemption issues. T.I.R. No. 1379, May 27, 1975, 9 CCH 1975 STAND.
FED. TAX REP. 6624.
219. 1975-1 CuM. BULL. 158.
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tatively determined to subsume the other enumerated categories in section
501(c)(3), it follows that discriminatory religious schools may not be treated
any more favorably than other private schools.22 0 This treatment also is
consistent with Green and more recent authorities that reaffirm the strong
public policy against discrimination in education.2 2 1 But the ruling appears
to be limited to those religious schools whose secular program parallels state
law requirements for public education. It thus leaves open the possibility
that schools devoted to purely religious pursuits, such as Catechism or Hebrew,
2 22
might not be in jeopardy even if they are separately incorporated.
The ruling also states that disqualification of a separately incorporated
school would not necessarily affect the exemption of the overseeing church
"solely as a result of the organization and control of the school. ' ' 22 2 But if

the school is not separately incorporated, as in "situation 2," then the church
itself will lose its exemption. The church in "situation 3" likewise would be
disqualified because it directly operated a discriminatory school (in addition
to a separately incorporated one), and it would be no defense that the discrimination was commanded by a tenet of its religion.2 - On the other hand,
220. See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
221. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), in which the Court struck down a
Mississippi free textbook loan program because it provided aid to private racially
segregated schools, many of which were church affiliated. In so holding, the Court
reaffirmed the right of these schools to exist and operate, see Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925), but nonetheless observed that "[a] State may not grant the type of
tangible financial aid here involved if that aid has a significant tendency to facilitate,
reinforce, and support private discrimination." 413 U.S. at 467. Cf. Runyon v. McCrary,
96 S.Ct. 2586 (1976) in which the Court held that 42 U.S.C. §1981 (the successor to
the Civil Rights Act of 1866) prohibits private, commercially operated nonsectarian
schools from denying admission to prospective students because they are Negroes. In
Runyon, however, the Court pointed out that the case did not present any question of
the right of a private school "to limit its student body to boys, to girls, or to adherents
of a particular religious faith" or the right of a sectarian school to "practice racial
exclusion on religious grounds." Id. at 2592.
222. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
223. Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 Cum. BULL. 159.
224. 1975-1 Cum. BuLL. 159. The Service's position in "Situation 3" was consistent
with its contentions in the Bob Jones litigation that racial discrimination in education
was the type of religious conduct (as opposed to belief) that could be subject to reasonable
government interference. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (Mormons
can believe anything they want, but engaging in polygamy constitutes conduct that may
be regulated by state to conform with moral standards of community); Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333 (1890) (statute may constitutionally deprive teachers of polygamy from right
to vote in general elections). Apart from the famous Mormon cases, courts have upheld
restrictions on allegedly religious conduct where the governmental interest was certainly
no more significant than preventing discrimination in education and the restrictions
imposed were far more severe than the revocation of tax benefits. See, e.g., Cap Santa Vue,
Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 424 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (duty of employer to bargain in good faith
despite religious belief); United States v. Spears, 443 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1020 (1972) (restrictions on dissemination of religiously esteemed illicit drugs);
Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 1013 (1954) (minimum wage laws take precedence over belief that employees were
engaged in work of church rather than labor for wages); Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol29/iss1/2

40

Schwarz: Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions: When Should the Church Render
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

the Service made it clear in a subsequent pronouncement that a school which
selects students on the basis of membership in a religious denomination will
not be deemed to have a discriminatory policy if membership in the denomination is open to all[ on a racially nondiscriminatory basis. 225
At one level, this ruling advises the racist religion to establish a separately
incorporated school system unless it wants to jeopardize the exempt status
of its churches. But the Service neglects to disclose whether it will revoke
the exemption of a church that discriminates on the basis of race in its
membership or espouses racist tenets. Logically extended, the contemporary
understanding of the term "charitable" might require the Service to go
beyond the schoolhouse door and deny exempt status to any racist charity,
even a church. It also might be contended that because section 501(c)(3) type
benefits constitute federal "subsidies," they may not be granted to any group
with a racially restrictive membership policy without running afoul of the
226
due process clause of the fifth amendment.
The weakness in these arguments is that they fail to strike a balance
between first and fifth amendment principles. It is one thing to deny tax
benefits to a religious institution that operates an essentially nonreligious
activity, such as a school, on a discriminatory basis. In that case, the firm
policy against segregated educational facilities justifies withholding whatever constitutional protection the first amendment might offer.227 Similarly,
a school using religion as a subterfuge for practices that in substance are based
on political or sociological ideologies should not be entitled to cloak itself
in the protection of the free exercise clause.228 But it is quite another matter

F.2d 14 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971) (abhorrence of closed shop because
of religious beliefs does not excuse payment of union dues).
225. Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 CuLm. BULL. 587.
226. The leading authority on this point is McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448,
1972-1 U.S.T.C. 9185 (D.D.C. 1972), in which a three-judge court held that the Secretary
of the Treasury could not grant federal income tax exemptions under §501(c)(8) to
fraternal orders that excluded nonwhites from membership or allow donors to deduct
gifts to such organizations under §170(c)(4). The "subsidy" theory is somewhat inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's statement in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), that
tax exemptions confer merely "an indirect economic benefit" that "is not sponsorship
since the government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains
from demanding that the church support the state." Id. at 674-75. See also Pitts v. Wisconsin
Dept. of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wisc. 1971) (state property and income tax
exemption to clubs, societies, fraternal orders, and other associations with racially restrictive
membership rules violate fourteenth amendment); Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d
623, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9368 (2d Cir. 1974), dismissed on remand, 1975-2 U.S.T.C. 9721
(W.D.N.Y. 1975) (because of federal tax exemption, discriminatory practices of charitable
foundations might constitute "state action" under fifth and fourteenth amendments).
But cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (Moose Lodge could retain state
liquor license despite racially restrictive membership rules). For a penetrating criticism of
the McGlotten "subsidy" theory, see Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights:
"Constitutionalizing" the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972).
227. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973); Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S.Ct.
2586, 2596-97 (1976); Note, supra note 198, at 939-40.
228. See Note, supra note 216.
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to strip a tax exemption from a church that qua church restricts its membership on racial or ethnic grounds. To be sure, these churches may not be
admirable. Many may find them offensive. Perhaps, as Professor Bittker has
proposed, they are most aptly characterized as "ludicrous, harmless, innocent,
anachronistic, defensive, evanescent, inconsequential, functioned, embattled,
or praiseworthy."2 2 9 But no evidence has been gathered that a church's restrictive tenets are illegal or violate those notions of public policy that underlie
the federal commitment to integrated education. In short, in this delicate area,
the Internal Revenue Service would do well to halt at the gates of the
230
church, preserving valuable religious and associational rights in the process.
C. Some Remaining Questions

Even if the Service stops at the door of the church, it is not entirely
clear how it will enforce its rules with respect to religious schools.22 1 In a
controversial revenue procedure, onerous guidelines and recordkeeping requirements have been set forth to assist in determining if private schools that
apply for exempt status or desire to retain an exemption have racially discriminatory policies that would preclude exemption.23 2 In essence, a school
must state its open door policy in all written advertising and must take
affirmative steps to make its policy known to all segments of the community.233
In addition, it must be prepared to demonstrate that its programs and
facilities, as well as its scholarship and loan programs, are operated in a nondiscriminatory manner. Detailed records are required to document compliance
with the guidelines.23 The manner in which these rules are applied inevitably
will shape the development of those issues that remain.
229. Bittker & Kaufman, supra note 226, at 86.
230. Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80. In his dissenting
opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas recognized that fraternal orders have certain associational
rights which, absent governmental involvement, permit groups to discriminate, "[s]o the
fact that the Moose Lodge allows only Caucasians to join or come as guests is constitutionally
irrelevant, as is the decision of the Black Muslims to admit to their services only members
of their race." Id. Churches, no doubt, stand on an even stronger footing.
231. An interesting case in point may be Brigham Young University, the largest churchrun university in the United States. The school is sponsored by The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints and is necessarily bound by Mormon doctrine, which relegates
blacks to second-class membership. As of this writing, the University had 25,000 full-time
students, 95% of them Mormon, but only four blacks. One of those blacks recently was
elected as vice president of Brigham Young's student body. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1976,
§1 at 38, cols. 1-4.
232. Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 CuM. BULL. 587.
233. This may be accomplished by publication of a notice in a newspaper of general
circulation, use of the broadcast media, use of brochures and catalogues, and communication to leaders of racial groups. Church-related schools with at least 75% enrollment
consisting of students who are members of the sponsoring denomination are exempt
from the general publicity requirements, but they must advertise their nondiscriminatory
policy in "whatever newspapers or circulars the religious denomination or unit utilizes
in the communities from which students are drawn." Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 Cums. BULL. 587.
234. Id. A somewhat equivocal example of compliance with one of these guidelines
appears in the catalog of the Law School of Brigham Young University, which states:
"Students of any race, color,. creed, sex or national origin are accepted f~r, admission,
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A final question that is about to emerge is whether the developing federal
public policy against sex discrimination will become sufficiently compelling
to have an impact on the tax treatment of section 501(c)(3) charities, including
churches. It is arguable that the federal public policy premise of Green
could equally apply to organizations practicing sex discrimination, 2 5 but
until now the courts have concluded otherwise.23 6 The temptation of those
who justifiably argue for equal rights for women may be to punish man's inhumanity to woman by launching a massive governmental inspection program, including threats to withdraw tax benefits. In the course of this
crusade, a certain sensitivity to the idiosyncratic tenets of religions would be
desirable. One can hope that women will be permitted to join the priesthood
or sit with men in an Orthodox Jewis synagogue but may these reforms
not be at the behest of an Internal Revenue agent.
IV.

THE PROFIT-MAKING RELIGION

Another manifestation of the movement to limit religious tax exemptions
revolves around the church as entrepreneur and investor. The extent of
the religious financial empire may be exaggerated, but it is clear that religious
organizations have been actively engaging in a variety of businesses, often
in competition with taxpaying citizens. Churches reportedly operate radio
and television stations, newspapers, hotels, motels, parking lots, bakeries and
even girdle factories. 23 7 Some denominations are believed to have amassed
enormous real estate and securities holdings, and a few sects appear to
serve as tax-free receptacles for the benefit of a select group of private in23 8

terests.

Setting to one side questions of state and local property taxation, this
article will restrict its treatment to three problems of the profitable religion
under the Internal Revenue Code: withdrawal of exempt status because of
excessive commercial activity; the impact of the unrelated business tax; and
inurement of gain to private individuals.
A.

Withdrawal of Exempt Status

The fact that an otherwise charitable or religious organization generates
income from business operations does not necessarily mean that it will be
provided they maintain ideals and standards in harmony with those of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and meet the academic requirements of the Law School."
Brigham Young University, ]. Reuben Clark Law School, 1975-1976 Catalog 12.
235. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971). Cf. Moritz v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 466, 1972-2 U.S.T.C. %9759 (10th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973).

236. See McCoy v. Shultz, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 9233 (D.D.C. 1973); Junior Chamber of
Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974).
237. See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., IstSess. (1969), 1969-3 CUNs. BULL. 230;
J. RUSKAY & R. OSSERNIAN, supra note 12, at 18-22; M. LARSON & C. LOWELL, supra note 7,
at 179-205.
238. See generally M. LARSON & C. LOWELL, supra note 7.
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denied tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) and the attendant deduction
provisions. Even if an organization operates a trade or business as a substantial
part of its activities, it may remain exempt if the operation of the business
is in furtherance of the group's exempt purposes. 239 But when its "primary
purpose" becomes the operation of an "unrelated trade or business," an
organization will lose its exemption even though it also may be devoted to
religious pursuits and its profits do not inure to the benefit of private individuals. 240 In their typical open-ended fashion, the regulations provide
that a determination of the existence or non-existence of such a primary
purpose will turn on all the facts and circumstances, "including the size and
extent of the trade or business and the size and extent of the activities which
are in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes." 241
Application of these rules to religious organizations has proven to be
difficult in light of their tendency to claim that all the income they derive
from passive investments or commercial activities is destined to support their
religious mission. In an early decision, the Supreme Court adopted this
"destination of income" test in upholding the exempt status of a religious
mission which earned income both from investments and the sale of wine
and chocolate. 242 The extreme sanction of withdrawal of exempt status has
been reserved for unorthodox or egregious cases. A rare example is Parker
v. Commissioner,243 where the Eighth Circuit concluded that the Foundation
for Divine Meditation did not qualify for section 501(c)(3) status because
it had the "very substantial purpose" of publishing and commercially exploiting the writings of its founder, one Merle Parker. 4 4 The court was
careful to protect the typical evangelist by pointing out that a religious
organization will not lose its exemption merely because it conducts healing
crusades, publishes newsletters or offers literature for sale. 2' 5 But the Founda-

239. TREAs. REG. §1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(l). Even though the organization may retain its exemption, it nonetheless may be subject to the unrelated business tax. See text accompanying
notes 251-284 infra.
240. TREAs. REG. §1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1). Certain religious and apostolic associations with a
common or community treasury are permitted to remain exempt under §501(d) even if
they engage in business for the common benefit of their members. But the members must
include in their gross income as a dividend their entire pro rata share, whether distributed
or not, of the group's net income for the taxable year. INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, §501(d).
This provision appears to have been designed to cover monasteries whose members pursue
a communal business the proceeds of which inure to the individual members. See generally
6 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 34.41 (1975).
241. TREAS. REG. §1.501(c)(3)-l(e)(1).
242. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578 (1924). For most purposes, the "destination of income" test has been legislatively overturned. Thus, so-called "feeder" corporations,
which engage in business activities for the benefit of an affiliated charity, are no longer
exempt from tax merely because all their profits are payable to an exempt organization.
See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §502(a); B. HOPKINS & J. MYERS, supra note 42, at 319-23.
243. 365 F.2d 792, 1966-2 U.S.T.C. 9647 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026
(1967).
244. Id. at 797, 1966-2 U.S.T.C. at 87,121.
245. Id. at 798, 1966-2 U.S.T.C. at 87,122.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol29/iss1/2

44

Schwarz: Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions: When Should the Church Render
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

tion apparently failed art "aroma test" because it used blatantly commercial
246
techniques to promote the sale of material that was far from sacred.
Troublesome questions also have arisen in the more traditional context
of the religious publishing house. If the sale of religious literature is incidental
to the propagation of a group's beliefs, the activity will be regarded as
"religious" in character even if it produces an operating profit.2 4 7 The theory
is that the profits are not being sought for their own sake, but only as a means
of carrying out an exempt purpose. But when a religious publisher begins to
emulate a successful counterpart, courts become more skeptical. Such a case
was Scripture Press Foundation v. United States,-8 in which a nonprofit
corporation engaged in the sale of religious literature and Sunday school
supplies lost its exemption. Although the Foundation's objectives may have
been religious, the court observed that "[p]iety is no defense to the assessments of the tax collector" and went on to conclude that the Foundation's
religious objectives were incidental to the sale of literature for financial
gain. 249 On the other hand, a consistent deficit ordinarily will be enough
25
to convince a court that profits are not the goal of the operation. 1
Upon the enactment of the unrelated business tax, the pressure to withdraw exemptions because of commercial activities eased considerably. For
many years, churches were immune from this tax and thus were able to
gain a competitive advantage over both charitable and commercial counterparts. Congress corrected this disparity in 1969, however, and with the expiration of a five year grace period, churches are just beginning to evaluate
their exposure to this new limitation on their tax-exempt status.
B.

The UnrelatedBusiness Tax

1. Background. When Congress added the unrelated business tax to
the Code in 1950, it covered most exempt organizations, but churches and
associations or conventions of churches were excepted.2 5 1 The purpose of the
tax was to eliminate unfair competition between exempt and nonexempt
business operations- a policy as applicable to churches as it was to other
charities. 252 The purpose of the exception was less clear, but effective
246. The court in Parker was influenced by several unusual publications which bore
little relationship to traditional religious purposes. It cited examples such as: the Santa
Ysabel Ming Tree Society, a scheme whereby customers received ming tree seeds for
the payment of "dues;" "The $25,000 Pyramid Plan," where purchasers were instructed
on how to raise earthworm,; for profit; and a ten-lesson correspondence course entitled
"Secrets of Wealth, Power and Success," under which participants were promised earnings
of $1,000 per month within six months in exchange for a $23.30 payment. Id. at 797-98,
1966-2 U.S.T.C. at 87,122.
247. See Saint Germain Foundation, 26 T.C. 648 (1956); Unity School of Christianity,
4 B.T.A. 61 (1926).
248. 285 F.2d 800, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. 9195 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962).
249. Id. at 804-05, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. at 79,418. See also Fides Publishers Assoc. v. United
States, 263 F. Supp. 924, 1967-1 U.S.T.C. 9251 (N.D. Ind. 1967).
250. See Elisian Guild, Inc. v. United States, 412 F.2d 121, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. 9483
(lst Cir. 1969); Golden Rule Church Assoc., 41 T.C. 719 (1964).
251. See text accompanying notes 90-102 supra.
252. See S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 483, 504. For
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sermonizing by church lobbies appears to have been a major influence.2 5-3
When many churches began to exploit their favored status, even the
sensibilities of religious leaders were offended, a condition that was exacerbated
by unfavorable publicity and threatening lawsuits.2 54 After some deliberation, the churches reappraised their position, and in an attempt to mute
the rising criticism, two influential bodies (The National Council of Churches
and the United States Catholic Conference) urged Congress to eliminate
25
the church exemption. 5
Congress willingly obliged in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 by extending
the tax to churches, 256 but simultaneously mitigated the impact of the change
by providing a five-year grace period to permit churches to spin off or reorganize business activities. Accordingly, in the case of any trade or business
carried on before May 27, 1969, the tax did not become applicable until
taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1976.257 As the discussion
below will demonstrate, still other modifications and exceptions further
blunted the thrust of the tax.
2. Outline of the Tax. The unrelated business tax provisions are
immensely complex, and an analysis of all their intricacies is beyond the
scope of this article. 258 A brief outline of the tax and its exceptions, however,
will serve to identify the major issues that are expected to affect churches.
The tax is levied at corporate rates (or at individual rates in the case of
certain charitable trusts) on the gross income derived by an organization
from "any unrelated trade or business" less any deductions directly connected
with that business. 259 A trade or business is "unrelated" if its conduct is "not
substantially related" to the exercise or performance of the organization's
exempt purposes. 260 The term "trade or business" is regarded as having the
a recent discussion of the unrelated business tax, including a criticism of the "unfair
competition" theory, see Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 49, 316-25.
253. See L. PFEFER, supra note 2, at 76-77.
254. Id. at 77-78. See also Whelan, Churches and the Tax on Unrelated Business Income, 20 CATH. LAW. 357, 359 (1974).

255. See Joint Statement of the National Council of Churches and the United States
Catholic Conference, 1 Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate Committee on Finance,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1969). In addition, in its amicus brief in Walz v. Tax Commission,
the United States Catholic Conference informed the Supreme Court that it did not defend
any tax exemption on church properties used or operated for commercial purposes. Brief
for the United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae 26-27 n.8, Walz v. Tax
Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
256. Tax Reform Act of 1969, §121(a). See Jt. Committee on Int. Rev. Tax., 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., General Explanation of Tax Reform Act of 1969 at 66-67 (1970).
257. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §512(b)(16); Whelan, supra note 254, at 361. Businesses
undertaken after May 27, 1969, immediately became subject to the tax. The transitional

rule also did not apply to unrelated debt-financed income. See text accompanying notes
274-284 infra.
258. For a detailed but lucid explanation of these provisions, see B. HOPKINS & J. MYMRs,
supra note 42, at 324-54.
259. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§511(a)-(b), 512(a)(1). The regulations provide rules to
ensure that allocable deductions have a proximate and primary relationship to the
carrying on of the trade or business. See Tus. REG. §1.512(a)-(1).
260. iNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §513(a).
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same meaning as it does in section 162(a), which allows a deduction for
ordinary and necessary business expenses. In general, the concept includes
''any activity carried on for the production of income from the sale of
goods or performance of services."261 In particular, it is expansive enough
to embrace advertising revenues from a church periodical even if the editorial
2 62
content of the publication is related to the church's religious purposes.
Under this statutory scheme, if a church enterprise is, in fact, a trade or
business, it will be subject to the tax only if: (1) the business is "regularly
carried on;" and (2) the conduct of the business is not substantially related
to the performance of the church's exempt functions. The "regularity" test
focuses on the frequency and continuity of the activity. The rental of space
in a church parking lot on a once-a-week basis would be "regular," but
income from intermittent activities, such as annual fund raising events or
2 63
dances, would not be taxed.

The "relatedness" test may raise more serious problems for churches
because it requires a sensitive examination of the nature and scope of a
church's exempt purposes. The regulations obliquely provide that to be
substantially related to an exempt purpose, an activity must contribute in
some important sense to the accomplishment of that purpose. 264 Once again,
all the facts and circumstances control this determination, but particular
emphasis is placed on the size and extent of the activity. Thus, if a business
is conducted on a scale larger than necessary to carry out an exempt purpose,
it ordinarily will be subject to the tax.2 65 The potential for competition with

a commercial counterpart is another important factor, and it is no defense
that the profits derived from a business are destined to support a church's
religious activities.

266

As is so often the case in the Internal Revenue Code, these general rules
tend to become overshadowed by a myriad of exceptions, some of which
are only enjoyed by churches. For example, it is clear that certain activities
will not be taxed if they are carried on in connection with church operations.
In reporting out the Tax. Reform Act of 1969, the Senate Finance Committee
expressed its intent to grant immunity to: the operation and maintenance
of cemeteries; the sale of religious articles and the printing, distribution and
261.

TREAS. REG. §1.513-1(b).

262. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §513(c); TREAs, REG. §1.513-I(b). See also Spevack,
Taxation of Advertising Income of Exempt Organizations' Publications, 21 CATH. LAW.
268 (1975).
263. TREAS. REG. §1.513-1(c). Cf. Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church of Miami,
404 U.S. 412 (1972).
264. TREAS. REG. §1.513-1(d)(2).
265. Id. Even though an activity may not be in competition with other businesses,
it still can be subject to the unrelated business tax. For example, the profits from public
bingo games, when regularly carried on by labor and civic organizations, have been ruled
taxable. See Smith-Dodd Businessman's Ass'n, Inc., 65 T.C. 55 (1975); Rev. Rul. 59-330,
1959-2 CuM. BULL. 153. It is doubtful that bingo income derived by a church will be
treated any differently, but churches may be tempted

to contend that their regular

bingo games, bazaars and raffles are ultimately related to God because their purpose is to
raise funds to propagate the faith. See Whelan, supra note 254 at 364-65.
266. TREAs. REG. §1.513-1(b).
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sale of religious pamphlets, tracts, calendars, papers, books and magazines
with a substantial religious content (even though a small amount of advertising is included); and the conduct of certain charitable institutions, such
27
as nursing and retirement homes.
Several statutory modifications also narrow the scope of the tax. Each
entity receives a $1,000 deduction, much like a dependency exemption, for
purposes of computing its unrelated business taxable income, and a special
rule provides that in the case of a diocese, province of a religious order, or a
convention or association of churches, each individual parish church or other
local unit is entitled to a specific $1,000 deduction. 251 Trades or businesses
where "substantially all" of the work is carried on by uncompensated volunteers also are excepted, as are activities conducted primarily for the convenience of members, students, patients or employees (e.g., a museum cafeteria)
2 69
and operations for the sale of donated merchandise (e.g., a thrift shop).
The uncompensated volunteer exemption may prove to be particularly helpful
to religious orders whose members have taken a vow of poverty, unless the
Internal Revenue Service decides to treat the living allowance provided by
2 0
the order as compensation. 7
From a monetary standpoint, perhaps the most valuable benefit is the
exclusion of most passive investment income. Dividends, interest, annuities,
royalties, rents from real property, and capital gains and losses are not included in "unrelated business taxable income," subject of course to the
27
The treatment of real property rentals as "passive"
usual exceptionsY.
income is questionable, since it allows charities unfairly to compete with
commercial lessors.2 7 2 Even the exclusion of dividends may contribute to
the unfair competition that the unrelated business tax was designed to
prevent. Because dividends received by churches are tax-free, a church-owned
subsidiary is not required to pay as high a dividend as other corporations
to produce the same net return to its stockholders. Church-owned corporations therefore can retain more earnings for internal expansion or perhaps
2 72
charge lower prices than their non-exempt competitors.
267. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969-3 Cum. BULL. 469. Insofar as publications are concerned, it is likely that this exception will only extend to income from their
sale and not to advertising income. See Spevack, supra note 262, at 269.
268.

INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, §512(b)(12); T .AS. REG. §l.512(b)-1(h).

269. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §513(a)(1)-(2).
270. See Whelan, supranote 254, at 368.
271. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§512(b)(1), (2), (3), (5). One exception is for rent from
certain personal property that is leased together with real property. Id. §512(b)(3). Passive
income also is not exempt when received from an 80o controlled corporation or from
certain debt-financed investments. Id. §§512(b)(4),(15).
272. For example, if a church rents an apartment house or commercial office building
that is unencumbered by debt, all the rental income will be exempt from tax. If, however,
the rent is dependent on the income or profits derived by the lessee (other than a fixed
percentage of gross receipts or sales), this exemption does not apply and the rent would
be fully taxable. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §512(b)(3)(B)(ii); Reed, Exemptions from
Unrelated Business Tax- Rental Income, 21 CATH. LAW. 282 (1975).
273. See The Guild- of St. Ives, Churches and Taxation Revisited 21 (1974). To prevent
any further advantages from operating an exempt organization's business through a

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol29/iss1/2

48

Schwarz: Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions: When Should the Church Render
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

3. Unrelated Debt-Financed Income. The unrelated business tax provisions are complemented by an even more complex series of rules and
exceptions designed to tax the income from debt-financed property. Prior to
1969, some exempt organizations were taxed on certain rentals from debtfinanced real property, but this provision did not cover churches nor did it
apply to income from the leasing by a tax-exempt organization of the assets
of a going business.2 7 4 Churches were in a unique position to exploit the
weaknesses of the law by engaging in so-called "bootstrap transactions"
whereby they acquired businesses and other property on credit and then
operated them, often through a leaseback to the seller, without payment
of taxes. A typical transaction might be structured as follows: Church would
purchase an apartment house from Taxpayer, paying little or nothing down
and financing the balance of the purchase price with a 20-year purchase
money mortgage. Church then would enter into a net lease arrangement
with Taxpayer, who would agree to pay all property taxes, insurance and
operating expenses and remit a net rental to Church. The tax-free payments
to Church would enable it to amortize the mortgage and still realize a profit,
while Taxpayer would enjoy capital gains treatment upon the "sale" and
deductions for rent, taxes and other operating profits while it used the
property. In some cases, Church ultimately might sell the property back
to Taxpayer (or a third party) at a large profit, which would be immune
2
from capital gains tax. 7
In an attempt to combat these abuses, Congress extended the debt-financed
income provision to all exempt organizations, without any special transitional
rule for churches, and expanded section 514 of the Code so as to include
within "unrelated business income" any passive income of an exempt organization to the extent that the property generating that income was acquired,
directly or indirectly, with borrowed fundsY 6 Thus, if an apartment house is
subject to a 60 percent mortgage, that same percentage of the rental income
business tax purposes.
and deductions is taken into account for2 unrelated
7
Capital gains are taxed in similar fashion. 7
controlled subsidiary, the Code provides that interest, annuities, rents and royalties will
not be within the passive income exclusion if received by the exempt organization
from an 80% controlled corporation if the latter corporation has income that, if received
directly by the parent, would. be unrelated business income. This prevents a church from
spinning off a business and then siphoning off its profits in the form of items such as
interest and rents, which would be deductible by the controlled corporation and yet
excludable as passive income by the church. Nonetheless, earnings still can be distributed
in the form of tax-free dividends, which would not be deductible by the controlled

corporation. See

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §512(b)(15).

274. See H.R. REtP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 1969-3 CuM. BULL. 229 (1969).
275. Similar devices were available to any type of exempt organization which purchased
a going business on credit. See Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 1965-1 U.S.T.C. 9375
(1965); But cf. University Hill Foundation v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 701, 1971-1 U.S.T.C.
19440 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972). For a commentary suggesting that
the concern over bootstrap transactions was more rhetoric than reason, see Bittker &
Rahdert, supra note 49, at 322-25.
276. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §514.
277. See TREAs. REG. §1.514(a)-I. The applicable percentage decreases as the mortgage
is paid off.
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At first glance, the reach of section 514 appears to be exceedingly broad.
"Debt-financed property" is defined to include all income-producing assets
with respect to which there is an "acquisition indebtedness" during the
taxable year or, in the case of disposed property, the preceding taxable
year.2 78 An "acquisition indebtedness" ordinarily would arise upon the actual
acquisition of the property, but the term is broad enough to include
indebtedness incurred prior to an acquisition if it would not have been
incurred "but for" the acquisition. Similarly, a debt incurred after the acquisition is an "acquisition indebtedness" if it would not have been incurred "but
for" the acquisition and was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the acquisi2
tion. 70
These rules will require a certain amount of vigilance on the part of
churches, since any indebtedness may trigger the taxation of passive income
even if the investment seems totally unrelated to the borrowing. However,
some protection is furnished by the "but for" test. As the legislative history
makes clear, where a church has a portfolio of investments with no debt and
subsequently incurs a debt to construct a church-related building, such as
a seminary, the debt will not be considered "acquisition indebtedness" with
respect to the portfolio. 28 0 On the other hand, if a church should sell property,
taking back a purchase money mortgage, and then acquire or construct replacement property financed in part by indebtedness, it may be subject to
taxation on the mortgage interest it receives even though the replacement
property is used entirely for religious purposes. This is based on the theory
that it was reasonably foreseeable at the time that the church took back the
purchase money mortgage that the acquisition of the replacement property
28
would need to be financed. '
Of course, these rules are not without their escape hatches. If "substantially
all" (85 percent or more) of the use of property is related to the exempt purposes of the organization, then income from it will not be taxed whether or
not it is debt-financed. 282 Another exception, known as the "neighborhood
land rule," rescues an organization which borrows to acquire real property
for prospective exempt use, but earns income from the land during the
period before it is actually devoted to exempt purposes. In that event, any
income from the property is exempt from tax if the property is located
"in the neighborhood" of the exempt organization and if it has been acquired
with the expectation that it will be used for exempt purposes within 10

278.

INT.REv. CODE OF 1954, §514(b)(1).

279. Id. §514(c)(1).
280. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 1969-3 CuM. BuLL. 465 (1969). Of course,
if the debt were incurred to acquire or construct rental property that was unrelated to
the church's religious purposes, then a portion of the rentals would be taxed. Likewise,
if a church were to pledge some of its investment securities with a bank for a loan and
use the proceeds to buy an office building which it planned to lease to the public, then
the loan would constitute "acquisition indebtedness." See TR.As. REG. §1.514(c)-I(a)(2),

Example (1).
281. See TazEs. REC. §1.514(c)-1(a)(2), Example (2).
282. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §514(b)(1)(A); TREAS. REG. §1.514(b).I(b)(1).
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years of the time of the acquisition. 28 3 A special rule of somewhat dubious
constitutionality provides a more liberal 15-year tax-free period for churches,
28 4
and the neighborhood requirement does not have to be satisfied.
4. Procedural Protection for Churches. A traditional precept of the
American tax system is that citizens are free to structure their business
affairs so as to minimize their tax liability. 285 With the coming of the unrelated business tax and its maze of exceptions, churches have added this
tenet to their catechism. Unlike other tax planners, however, churches have
been granted extraordinary protection from interested revenue authorities.
As a practical matter, the breadth of these administrative provisions may
prove to be the major source of future controversies.
An initial advantage is that "churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and
conventions or associations of churches" are not required to file annual
informational returns. 28 6 By contrast, virtually all other exempt organizations
283. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §514(b)(3). The regulations define the boundaries of the
neighborhood, focusing primarily on whether the acquired land is contiguous with existing
exempt purpose property. See TREAS. REG. §1.514(b)-1(d)(ii).
284. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §514(b)(3)(E). Churches also will be assisted by an exception
providing that if mortgaged property is acquired by devise or bequest, the mortgage will
not be treated as "acquisition indebtedness" for a period of 10 years from the date of
the acquisition. This 10-year rule also applies to gifts if the mortgage was placed on
the property more than five years before the date of the gift and the property was
held by the donor for more than five years before the gift. Neither of these exceptions will
apply if the church assures or agrees to pay the debt or pays anything for the owner's
equity in the property. Id. §514(c)(2)(B).
285. A classic expression of this principle has been furnished by Judge Learned Hand,
who once stated: "[Tihere is nothing sinister in so arranging one's affairs as to keep
taxes as low as possible. . . . [F]or nobody owes any public duty to pay more than
the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand
more in the name of morals is mere cant." Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51,
1947-1 U.S.T.C. 19175, at 156 (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 859 (1947). In the
wake of the unrelated business tax, church lawyers have quite reasonably been practicing
this approach. For a recent planning perspective, see Nolan, Application of Unrelated
Business Income Tax to Churches, 21 CATH. LAW. 247 (1975); Panel Discussion on Unrelated Business Income Tax, 21 CATH. LAW. 287 (1975).
286. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6033(a)(2)(A)(i). The introduction of the term "integrated
auxiliary" has raised new definitional questions. The Service initially has proposed regulations establishing a two-fold test: first, the organization's primary purpose must be
"to carry out the tenets, functions, and principles of faith of the church with which
it is affiliated." Second, the organization's operation "in implementing such primary
purpose must directly promote religious activity among members of the church." The
term "affiliated" is defined as meaning either controlled by or associated with a church.
Examples of integrated auxiliaries included a separately incorporated theological seminary,
a religious youth organization and a men's fellowship association. A hospital affiliated with
a church, an elementary grade school owned by a church, an orphanage or an old age
home, however, did qualify. PROPOSED TREAs. REG. §1.6033-2(g)(5), 41 Fed. Reg. 6073 (1976).
Final regulations liberalized he test, however, by providing that an organization affiliated
with a church will be considered an integrated auxiliary if the principal activity of the
organization is "exclusively religious." TREAS. REG. §1.6033-2(g)(5). The final regulations
also excused pre-college educational organizations associated with a church from filing
informational returns under the discretionary power granted to the Service by §6033.
Id. §1.6033-2(g)(1)(vii).
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must disclose their income, expenses, assets and liabilities, and section 501(c)(3)
organizations must report, among other things, the compensation of officers,
directors, trustees and highly paid employees, and the names of substantial
contributors.2 8 7 Even churches with unrelated business taxable income are
exempt from the basic filing requirements, although they are obligated to
report their unrelated business and debt-financed income on a separate
form. 2s8 Since the parameters of these taxes are far from precise, a church
conceivably could justify a failure to file even this special return on the
ground that, in its view, any business profits were substantially related to
its exempt purposes or came within one or more of the numerous statutory
exceptions. In that event, the Internal Revenue Service would be hard
pressed to take issue with the church since it would not have been supplied
with the information upon which a challenge might be predicated.
Churches received additional protection when Congress, in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, sought to protect them from unnecessary governmental
interference by restricting the audit power of the Internal Revenue Service.
Initially, the bill provided that no audit would be permitted to determine
if a church was engaging in an unrelated trade or business unless an Internal Revenue Service official with the rank of Regional Commissioner or
higher believed that the organization was engaged in a taxable activity and
so notified it in advance of the examination.29 Believing this provision
allowed the Internal Revenue Service too much freedom to examine books
and records pertaining to purely religious activities, Senator Wallace Bennett
of Utah proposed the following additional language in a Senate floor amendment:
No examination of the religious activities of such an organization [a
church, etc.] shall be made except to the extent necessary to determine
whether such organization is a church or a convention or association of churches, and no examination of the books of account of
necessary to
such an organization shall be made other than the extent
290
determine the amount of tax imposed by this title.
The Bennett amendment, together with the previous language regarding
notice, is now incorporated in section 7605(c) of the Code, a provision of
uncertain scope. At the very least, the statute permits audits to determine
whether an organization is in fact a church and, if so, whether it is engaged
in an unrelated business. The Service apparently wants more authority,
however, and to that end it has promulgated regulations that permit audits
to: (1) determine the initial or continuing qualification of the organization
to exemption under section 501(c)(3); (2) determine if the organization
287. INT.

REV. CODE

OF 1954, §6033(a)(1); TaeAs. REG. §1.6033-2. See also notes 26-29

supra.
288. TaRAs. REG. §§1.6012-2(e), 1.6012-3(a)(5).
289. H.R. 15270, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., §121(t) (1969). See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. (1969), 1969-3 Cum. BULL. 357; S. Rrt. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969), 1969-3 Cum. BuLL. 468.
290. 115 CONG. EC. (Part 28) 37482-83 (1969).
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qualifies to receive deductible charitable contributions; (3) ascertain or
verify payments to other persons in the nature of salary or wages in connection with determining that person's tax liability; and (4) determine any tax
2
liability of the organization, not merely the unrelated business tax. 91
The regulations may well be contrary to the legislative history insofar
as they permit the Service to investigate areas beyond the unrelated business
tax. Thus, it is likely that churches will resist these attempts by the Service to
expand its audit authority. They can be expected to contend that the restrictions in section 7605(c) must be strictly construed to avoid what the
Supreme Court characterized in Walz v. Tax Commission292 as an excessive
entanglement between government and religion. It can be argued in response
that Walz recognized churches as one segment of a broader category of exempt
organizations. As such, they should be no less accountable than those other
293
groups.
On balance, it seems appropriate to begin asking churches to reveal more
about their finances. In many cases, they engage in activities that are indistinguishable from those of secular organizations, and, to that extent they
should not be granted the privilege of secrecy. Moreover, some churches
abuse their favored status, and then seek to escape scrutiny by hiding behind
the first amendment. 29 The tendency of the Internal Revenue Service to
overreact to some of these abuses compounds the problem. 29 5 All these
291. TREAS. REG. §1.7605-1(c). Consistent with the statute, the regulations also authorize
examination of the "religiou.; activities" of an organization to the extent necessary to
determine if it is, in fact, a church, but such examinations also are authorized to
determine initial or continuing qualification for exempt status and eligibility to receive
deductible contributions. Notice from the Regional Commissioner is not necessary as
a prerequisite to examination of religious activities to determine whether an organization
is a church. Id.
292. 397 U.S. 644 (1970).
293. Demands for accountability are being heard with increasing frequency. In its
report on private philanthropy, the Filer Commission recommended that all tax-exempt
organizations with annual budgets of more than $100,000 be required to prepare and
make available detailed annual reports on their finances, programs and priorities. Over
the objection of several Commission members, churches and church affiliates were excepted.
See GIvING IN AMERICA, supra note 12, at 162-67, 213. At this writing, several bills have
been introduced in the Congress to regulate charitable solicitations and require charities
to spend a specified portion of their net revenues for charitable purposes. For a summary
of this legislation, see Hopkins, The Prospective Role of the Federal Government in
Regulating Charitable Solicitations and Distributions, in SIXTH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE,
supra note 30, at 171-79. As initially drafted, these proposals have specifically exempted
churches, but their sponsors may reconsider and seek to include them in any final legislation. See Deedy, supra note 12.
294. One recent revelation concerned the Pallotine Fathers, a missionary order in
Baltimore, which reportedly has raised between $8-15 million annually, but spends very
little of that amount for its overseas missions. Most of the funds have been invested
in real estate and business transactions, and it was discovered that $54,000 had been
loaned to the governor of Maryland to help finance his divorce settlement. Deedy, supra
note 12. The Korean minister Sun Myung Moon, whose Unification Church has amassed a
variety of businesses and investments, also has stimulated suspicion. See Rice, supra note 7.
295. See, e.g., United States v. Church of Scientology, 520 F.2d 818, 1975-2 U.S.T.C.
9584 (9th Cir. 1975); Handeland v. Commissioner, 519 F.2d 327, 1975-2 U.S.T.C. 9586
(9th Cir. 1975).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1976

53

Florida Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 2
19761

RELIGIOUS TAX EXEMPTIONS

consequences might be mitigated if churches were subject to the same disclosure requirements and the same susceptibility to audit as their charitable
counterparts. If there is a particular concern that religious freedom would
be jeopardized, it would be simple to provide a narrow exclusion from disclosure with respect to purely sacramental activities.
C. Inurement of Private Gain

A final issue is raised by the church which enriches not its congregation
or society at large, but rather its earthly founder. To ensure that charitable
organizations serve public rather than private interests, the Code provides
that an organization will not qualify for section 501(c)(3) status unless "no
part of.. . [its] net earnings

. .

inures to the benefit of any private share-

holder or individual. 296 Private inurement may manifest itself in many
forms, the most blatant of which is excessive compensation. More subtle
techniques include self-dealing transactions, such as sales, leases, loans, and
the furnishing of goods and services between an organization and private
9
individuals.2 7
From the dearth of reported cases it would seem that the clergy has resisted these temptations, but churches clearly are not immune from the
inurement limitation. Indeed, the major target of the Internal Revenue
Service in the inurement area has been the religious faith known as
Scientology. One of Scientology's major rituals is a process known as
"auditing," whereby followers seek to rid their spirits of "detrimental aberrations." This is accomplished by an "E-Meter," an electronic device designed
to measure changes in electrical resistance within a communicant's body. A
primary activity of the church has been to provide enrollees with these
"auditing" services for payment of a fee. The profits have been substantial;
an audit of the parent church's finances revealed that, during the late 1950's,
gross receipts of the parent church ranged from $102,000 to $247,000, and
more than 90 percent of this income was received from sales of auditing and
298
training services, including sales of the E-Meters.
Although the government cautiously refrained from contending that
Scientology was not a religion, it nonetheless revoked the parent church's
exemption because: (1) its sales activities constituted a substantial commercial
(and hence nonexempt) purpose, and (2) a part of its earnings inured to the
benefit of the church's founder, L. Ron Hubbard, and his family. The Court
of Claims upheld the revocation on the inurement ground. Although it
found that the actual compensation and expense reimbursements derived
296. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §501(c)(3). See also TREAs. REG. §§1.5O1(a)-1(c), 1.501(c)(3)1(c)(2). A similar restriction is contained in the corresponding charitable deduction sections. See INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, §§170(c)(2)(C), 2055(a)(2), 2522(a)(2).
297. See generally B. HopluNs & J. Mms, supra note 42, at 106-15.
298.

Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197, 1198-99, 1969-2

U.S.T.C. 9538, at 85,394-95 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970). The church
has also been the target of the Food and Drug Administration. See Founding Church of
Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. donied, 396 U.S. 963

(1969).
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by Mr. Hubbard ($108,000 over a four-year period) was not an unusually
large amount, it nonetheless discovered other indicia of inurement, including
provision of an automobile and residence for the Hubbards; a steady increase
in Hubbard's compensation, which was based on a percentage of gross sales;
and a suspicious pattern of payments to members of Hubbard's family in
the form of loans, inflated rentals and compensation for nonexistent services. 299
Although Scientology may be viewed as presenting an extreme factual
situation, its principles are applicable in other religious settings. Many
evangelistic sects and some of the more unorthodox cults are operated
under the aegis of a single charismatic figure who is often blessed with the
unique ability to raise substantial sums of money. 300 If the inurement limitation is properly enforced, any direct or indirect payments to that individual,
beyond what might be classified as reasonable compensation, would constitute
grounds for revocation of the organization's exemption. Incidental benefits
are inevitable and can be excused, but the statute explicitly provides that
"no part" of an exempt organization's earnings should benefit private
interests. It follows that the amount or extent of the benefits should not be
30
dispositive if the inurement is genuine.

1

The difficulty in patrolling the inurement limitation stems from the
fact that religious organizations are free from the usual disclosure requirements.30 2 The situation is thus ripe for abuse. Some may suggest that this is
a small price to pay in order to preserve the separation of church and state.
But if the constitutional objections can be overcome, it would be a desirable
reform to require churches to report the compensation of their highest paid
trustees and employees and disclose any acts of self-dealing with any private
interests. Concurrently, it should be made clear that statutory audit restrictions do not preclude the Service from investigating possible violations of
the inurement clause. In the final analysis, these reforms might well strengthen

299. Id. at 1200-02, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,396-97. Since this decision, many affiliated
Scientology churches have battled to retain their exemptions. In recent years, the Service
has adopted the rather curious policy of imposing assessments against these churches and
then mooting any litigation of the merits at the last minute by refunding any taxes paid.
The courts have been less than sympathetic to this tactic. See United States v. Church of
Scientology of California, 520 F.2d 818, 1975-2 U.S.T.C. 9584 (9th Cir. 1975); Church of
Scientology of Hawaii v. United States, 485 F.2d 313, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 9659 (9th Cir.
1973). After many years of Strife, a court finally has determined, without explanation,
that a Scientology affiliate is entitled to a §501(c)(3) exemption, and there have been
indications that the Service has granted similar exempt status to most other local Scientology
churches. See Church of Scientology of Hawaii v. United States, 1975-2 U.S.T.C. 9651
(D. Haw. 1975); Scientology Churches Get Rulings, 3 TAX NOTES No. 43, at 28 (1975).
300. Some groups openly flaunt the inurement limitation and nonetheless retain their
exemption. An example is the Divine Light Mission, a cult headed by the teenaged
Guru Maharaj Ji, who reportedly resides in a $400,000 estate and rides in expensive
sports cars at the apparent expense of his followers. See M. LARSON & C. LOWELL, supra
note 7, at 191.
301. See Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197, 1202,
1969-2 U.S.T.C. 9538, at 85,398 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970).
302. See text accompanying notes 286-294 supra.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1976

55

Florida Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 2
1976]

RELIGIOUS TAX EXEMPTIONS

the role of the many religious organizations whose activities and purposes
comport with the underlying justification for favored tax treatment.
CONCLUSION

There is no reason to believe that the religious tax exemption is significantly
less secure today than it has been at any time in our income tax history.
Despite the increasing secularization of American society, religious organizations remain the wealthiest and most influential segment of that diffuse
category of institutions known as the voluntary sector. The major tools for
preserving the vitality of that sector and assuring the maintenance of a
pluralistic society are exemption from income taxation and the encouragement
of charitable giving through income tax deductions. Churches deserve these
benefits no less than any other charitable organization.
The boundaries of the voluntary sector are not limitless, however, and
qualification for tax exemption need not be perpetual or immutable. Some
flexible system of classification, including appropriate limitations, is required to separate those groups whose activities comport with the underlying
purpose for tax benefits from those which do not. In a time when new and
unconventional sects are emerging with increasing frequency, religious
organizations should not be immune from this process of classification. As
long as it remains sensitive to the unique constitutional status of religion,
the Internal Revenue Service can and should attempt to distinguish between
the genuine church, however unorthodox it may be, and the charlatan or
fraud.
Churches also should not enjoy any special privileges that are not shared
by the broad range of secular groups that qualify for exempt status under section 501(c)(3). The government has a legitimate interest in the evenhanded
administration of the laws affecting exempt organizations. Any system that
promotes the political interests of the church, or its racially discriminatory
schools, or its commercial enterprises, or the coffers of its clergy, by according
tax benefits that are unavailable to other groups, is unsound as a matter of
policy and questionable as a matter of constitutional law.
At the same time, Congress, the courts, and the revenue authorities must
not use conditions in the tax law to intimidate the church or interfere with
the free exercise of religion. The fact that limitations may be desirable does
not require that they must be construed with such a rigidity that God and
Caesar are forced into continuing confrontations.
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